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In the recent years the international trade arena has witnessed the growing importance 
of “within the border” barriers. Standards and technical regulations appear to several 
commentators as the new critical issue on the international trade agenda. Among these, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures occupy a special place because of their 
crucial aim to safeguard health and safety of human beings, plants and animals. From 
an economic efficiency point of view, there are very few circumstances in which it can 
be accepted as a departure from free trade.  
Henson S and Loader R have asserted that, “as tariffs and quantitative restrictions to 
trade have declined, there has been growing recognition that Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures can impede trade in agricultural and food products”.1 Many 
problems have been encountered by most of the developing countries in meeting the 
SPS requirements of developed countries. This has further resulted in them failing to 
export especially agricultural and food products. Attempts have been made to reduce 
the trade distortive effects of SPS measures, within the World Trade Organization 
(hereafter the WTO) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
                                                                 
1 Henson, S. J ,, and Loader, R, J. ‘Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards on developing 
countries  and the role of SPS Agreement’(1999), 15 (3), 9.  
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Phytosanitary Measures (hereafter the "SPS Agreement") but however, current 
initiatives fail to address many of the key problems experienced by developing 
countries.2 
The efforts to liberalize the world trade  reached a significantly higher stage when 
countries signed the Final Act concluding the Uruguay Round negotiations better known 
as the Marrakesh Declaration in Morocco in 1994.3 Before this declaration the world 
trade was governed by the General agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereafter the 
GATT) which came into force in 1948.4 This agreement was put in place so as to try and 
liberalize world trade and this can be evidenced by the successive rounds of 
negotiations and the establishment of the WTO in 1995. The WTO aims to assist 
developing countries to access the markets for the developed countries by using trade 
agreements such as the Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on African growth 
opportunity and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary.5 
Since its creation in 1948 the GATT has rendered discipline to national food safety and 
animal plant and health protection measures which affect trade. “Article 1 of the GATT, 
the Most Favored Nation treatment (MFN) clause called for non- discriminatory 
treatment of imported products from different foreign suppliers”.6  Apart from that, article 
III of the GATT prescribed that such products be treated equally to domestically 
produced goods with respect to any laws or requirements affecting their sale.7 “This is 
now recognized as the principle of national treatment”.8 These rules applied to pesticide 
residue and food additional limits as well as the restriction for animal and plant health 
purposes. However, the GATT rules also included an exception (article xx (b)) which 
eventually became the basis for SPS Agreement. Furthermore, article xx (b) stated that, 
“countries could take measures to protect human, animal or plant life or healthy as long 
                                                                 
2 Henson,S.J and Loader, R.J page  8. 
3 O. Giirler, ‘WTO Agreements on Non- Tariff Barriers and the Implication for the OIC Member States: 
Customs Valuation, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin and Import Licensing’, (2002) 1 JCE, 61, 62.  
4 Ibid O. Giirler page 61. 
5 Ibid O. Giirler page 61. 
6 Ibid O. Giirler page 62, 63. 
7 Article 3 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
8 Article 3 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
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as these do not unjustifiably discriminate between countries where the same conditions 
prevailed or were not designed to be a disguised hindrance to trade”.9 
In particular, “the Punta del Este declaration which launched the Uruguay round in 1986 
initiated the birth of the SPS measures”.10 The Uruguay round resulted in increased 
discipline in three areas namely in the agricultural sector i.e. market access, direct and 
indirect subsidies SPS measures.11 Furthermore, “these negotiations were to develop a 
multilateral system that would allow simplification and harmonization of SPS measures 
as well as elimination of all restrictions that lack any valid scientific basis”.12 
The SPS Agreement is of great importance to international trade as it extends 
significantly beyond the GATT obligations not to discriminate among or against imported 
products. It also improves certain international disciplines on national regulation 
regarding products characteristics and production. Spencer and Henson concurs that,  
“….the SPS Agreement should provide a means for developing countries to 
overcome some of the inherent problems they face in world agri-food trade, and 
the various special measures that exist within the Agreement are designed to 
recognize this”.13  
However, according to Henson and Loader, “concurrent with the liberalization of tariff 
and quantitative restrictions there has been increased concern pertaining to the impact 
of other measures on agricultural and food exports” in the form of non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) or non-tariff barriers (NTBs)”.14 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
constitute one of these NTBs. In this respect Michalopolous C, points out that “it is now 
widely acknowledged that technical measures such as food quality and (SPS) measures 
impede trade particularly in the case of developing countries”.15 The WTO SPS 
                                                                 
9 GATT article XX (b). 
10 O. Giirler, WTO Agreements on Non- Tariff Barriers and the Implication for the OIC Member States: 
Customs Valuation, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin and Import Licensing’, (2002) 1 JCE  page 
63. 
11 Ibid O. Giirler page 63-65. 
12 Henson, S. J, and Loader, R. J  page 7-8. 
13Henson, S. J and Loader, R.J, ‘Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards on Developing 
Countries and the Role of the SPS Agreement’ (1999)15 (3), page 355,356,357. 
14 Henson, S.J and Loader R. J page366. 
15 This is the case “independent of whether the countries in question are additionally a member of a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) or not” see C Michalopolous ‘The developing countries in the WTO’. (1999) 27 
World Development 117, 135, 136. 
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Agreement “adopted in the 1994 UR lays down a common basis with respect to SPS 
measures for all WTO Member countries”.16 According to Annex 1A of the SPS 
Agreement, SPS measures are defined as “all types of trade rules aimed at the 
protection of human, animal and plant life or health”.17 
The SPS Agreement is mainly aimed at protecting and improving the current human 
health, animal health, and phytosanitary situation of all Member countries.18  Griffin 
asserts that most of the non- tariff barriers to trade are now the subject of a number of 
multilateral and legally binding trade agreements.19 The main objective of these 
agreements is to do away with legal and bureaucratic issues that may pose obstacles to 
trade or that may be used as restrictions and discriminatory trade policies. These also 
include Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to Trade. 
However despite the fact that SPS measures help countries to protect their human, 
animal and plant life, the way in which the agreement is interpreted by developed 
countries hinders trade with developing countries. It is also noted that these non-tariff 
barriers may create problems that can be as serious as the actual tariff for duty rates 
charged at country boarders. SPS measures theoretically speaking are there to protect 
trade but however in practice they tend to be impediments to trade for developing 
countries as they fail to meet the requirements in developed countries.  
A particular matter affected by the situation is, market access which refers to the 
reduction of tariff or non- tariff barriers to trade by WTO members. The Agreement on 
Agriculture (AOA) required tariff reductions so that developing countries would be able 
to access the markets of developed countries.20 Market access is also one of the central 
core discussions of this thesis and is discussed under the current World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Doha Development Agenda Round. 
Indeed, it has been noted by a number of developing countries that the greatest barrier 
to trade in agricultural and food products, particularly in the case of the European Union 
                                                                 
16 Henson S.J and Loader, R. J page 355-357. 
17WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 1994 ANNEX 1 A.  
18 SPS Agreement ANNEX 1A (a)-(d). 
19 R. Griffin, History of the Development of the SPS Agreement; Plant Protection and Production Divison.  
20 WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 1994 Art 4. 
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(EU) are the SPS requirements.21 One could argue that “the problems developing 
countries have in following the SPS requirements reflect their wider resource and 
infrastructure constraints that limit not only their ability to comply with SPS 
requirements, but also their ability to demonstrate compliance”.22 The most specific 
problem is access to appropriate scientific and technical expertise. It should be noted 
further that in many developing countries knowledge of SPS issues is poor. This has 
been reflected “both within government and the food supply chain, and the skills 
required to assess SPS measures applied by developed countries are lacking”.23 
Furthermore, the issue of SPS measures becomes very problematic considering that 
one of the objectives underpinning the WTO is to contribute to the institution’s 
objectives by encouraging members to “enter into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements”.24 Such arrangements are directed at substantially 
reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade amongst other commitments. However, SPS 
measures do pose a fundamental challenge to this traditional “economic perspective” 
and this thesis will try to tackle this challenge and how this SPS Agreement impact on 
market access for developing countries in international trade. This analysis tries to 
disentangle the complexity of SPS measures that, uniquely amongst “potential trade 
obstacles”, mix elements of genuine protection and elements of disguised 
protectionism. This thesis will critically assess the SPS measures and the extent to 
which they pose as hindrance to developing countries in trying to access developed 
countries’ markets in particular the European Union (EU). The EU is of particular 
interest to this thesis as studies suggest that the SPS requirements called for by the EU 
in trade are more stringent thus hindering market access for other developing 
countries.25  
1.2    RATIONALE  
This thesis focuses on addressing the problem caused by different interpretations given 
to the SPS Agreement and also its application there by causing detrimental effect on 
                                                                 
21 Henson S.J and Loader, R. J page 355. 
22 WTO ‘Understanding the WTO’ Available at www.wto.org   ACCESSED ON 07 April 2016 
23 WTO ‘Understanding the WTO’ Available at www.wto.org   ACCESSED ON 07 April 2016. 
24 GATT Preamble. 
25 R. Griffin, History of the Development of the SPS Agreement; Plant Protection and Production Divison. 
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particular African developing countries’ market access, such as South Africa. It appears 
that, the underlying goals of the WTO and its predecessors to liberalize trade are being 
hindered by the obstacles posed by these SPS measures. It is therefore, important that 
all measures and forms that impede trade for developing countries in respect of market 
access be eliminated. 
Apart from that, it has been established that many SPS measures raises legitimate 
concerns about trade hindrance which may have greater implications for developing 
nations than for the developed ones. However, most of these measures require 
improved technology, for better production, efficient trade infrastructure and use of more 
expensive shipping material and all of this is more costly to implement in developing 
countries.26 It should be noted that the successful Rounds of the GATT and the 
establishment of the WTO (1995) have created opportunities for developing countries to 
access the markets of developed countries without obstacles.27 It appears however, that 
these opportunities and their progress are being hindered and threatened by the rapid 
growth of NTB’s (non- tariff barriers). It is therefore, fitting to submit that, SPS measures 
are the main focus of this thesis and in particular their impediment to trade for 
developing countries. Nevertheless, it has also been established that these SPS 
measures are not mandatory thus the assertion that they are used as protectionist tools 
by developed countries will be criticised later on in the thesis. 
In relation to the above highlighted rationale, Henson points out that,   
“SPS Agreement should provide a means for developing countries   to cater for 
the problems they face in trying to meet the requirements of the agreement and 
various special measures that exist within the agreement are designed to 
recognize this”.28 
                                                                 
26 Henson S. J and Loader R J page 359, 360. 
27 O. Giirler, WTO Agreements on Non- Tariff Barriers and the Implication for the OIC Member States: 
Customs Valuation, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin and Import Licensing’, (2002) 1 JCE page 
61, 62. 
28 Henson S.J and Loader, R.J page  359, 360. 
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However, it has been noted that developing countries are not currently benefiting from 
the SPS measures. Moreover, “evidence seems to suggest that these countries are 
adversely affected by the SPS measures which for various reasons are unable to 
implement or effectively participate in the processes”.29This thesis will thus, discuss 
some of the above raised concerns affecting developing countries due to 
implementation of SPS measures. 
It has been postulated that the constraints faced by developing countries in respect of 
their ability to export agricultural and food products to developed countries are mainly 
due to the overly stringent SPS requirements imposed by developed countries.30  It is 
therefore fitting, to note that, SPS requirements are one of the greatest impediments to 
market access for developing countries in terms of trade in agricultural and food 
products. In respect of this market access it will be of great significance if developing 
countries are given access to the markets of developed countries as this facilitates trade 
liberalization which is the main goal of the WTO. However, market access cannot be 
possible if SPS measures are not dealt with fairly and uniformly. Certainly, there is need 
to implement SPS measures to developing countries in line with the commitments of the 
SPS Agreement itself. Such commitments include the objective of extending special 
treatment to developing countries as highlighted in the preamble of the WTO and Article 
10 of the SPS. 
Moreover, it has been established that, the major goal of the WTO is to liberalise 
trade.31 SPS measures are being used as a gate away by developed countries which is 
contrary to the WTO goals. This thesis’ argument is that international trade facilitation 
can only be effective if SPS measures are regulated fairly by taking into consideration 
the needs of the developing countries. This thesis will also explain the negative impacts 
of the SPS measures on market access from the perspective of developing countries. 
                                                                 
29 S. Henson and R Loader, “Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards on Developing countries 
and the role of the SPS Agreement”,  page 359-361. 
30 Henson, S. J, and Loader, R. J,  page 28. 
31 O. Giirler, page 61. 
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1.3.        LITERATURE REVIEW 
It has been established that there is ample literature review centred on SPS measures 
and market access for developing countries in terms of International trade law. The 
journal article of Economic Cooperation by O. Giirler examines the issues of customs 
procedures and foreign trade customs administration under the related WTO 
Agreements and their implications for developing countries.32 
Scholars such as Ndayisenga, F, Kinsey, J., Henson and Loader have extensively 
written on effects of SPS measures in particular the effects of these measures on the 
market access of the developing countries and how they have created obstacles to 
trade due to failure of developing countries to meet the requirements of the SPS 
measures. It also appears that some of the scholars have also focused on how these 
SPS measures have been used as protectionist tool and how they have hindered 
developing countries’ ability to trade. To further cement the above Loader and Spencer 
asserts that, “although tariff barriers have been declined there is a concern that the non-
tariff measures (NTB’s/ NTM’s) can either explicitly or implicitly act as a barriers to trade 
in a similar manner to tariffs and quantitative restrictions”.33 
Henson and Loader purports that,  
“in the case of trade between developing and developed countries, it is evident 
that in many cases a “regulatory gap” can be observed both in terms of the level 
and types of SPS standards applied and the systems of conformity assessment 
that operate”.34 
 
This research concurs with the authors in the sense that this gap may impose costs of 
compliance on suppliers from developing countries over and above the costs of 
compliance of suppliers from developed countries. This is also further cemented by the 
fact that the degree to which these standards differ from those that exist in the supplier’s 
                                                                 
32 O. Giirler page 61. 
33 Henson, S. J and Loader, R.J, page 8. 
34 Henson, S.J and Loader, R.J Agri-business journal, page 359. 
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domestic market is reflected by the cost of compliance.35 It is further highlighted that 
developed countries apply stringent requirements than developing countries thus 
showing their greater economic means to control human, animal and plant health and 
demands of their population. 
Furthermore, it is of great significance to venture into the implications of the SPS 
measures in particular their effects to market access for developing countries to 
developed countries’ markets. With this in mind it is important to scrutinize the literature 
review surrounding market access as it plays a pivotal role in international trade. From 
this perspective, it is therefore suggested that potential means for reducing negative 
effects of SPS measures on developing countries be identified and implemented. More 
literature surrounding this topic is written from an economic perspective. This thesis will 
stimulate further research work to explore how this problem can be addressed from a 
legal perspective taking into account the relevant legal framework of the WTO 
Agreement. 
Furthermore, Henson and Loader purports that, SPS measures provides “long-term 
benefits provided that the agreement is implemented in an appropriate manner”.36 
However, the research assertion is that due to the diverse means whereby the SPS 
Agreement has been implemented by particular countries, there have been many 
concerns up to date which then create an obstacle to market access for developing 
countries to international trade. Apart from that even if they are implemented 
appropriately many developing countries seem to fail to reach the standards that are 
being set. They further postulated that, “developed countries apply stricter SPS 
measures than developing countries and that SPS controls in many developing 
countries are weak and overly fragmented”.37 The research quite frankly agrees with 
their postulation thus it will be therefore, fitting to submit that, SPS measures are a 
protectionist tool for developed countries and that they hinder the ability of developing 
countries to trade as they fail to meet the requirements of SPS measures. The above 
                                                                 
35 Henson S.J and Loader, R.J (see note33; 8). 
36 Henson, S. J and Loader, R. J page 10. 
37 Henson, S. J and Loader, R.J page 9. 
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noted assertion is further cemented by Murphy and Shleifer (1997) who submitted that, 
“more theoretical work has demonstrated that, developing countries find it hard and 
sometimes fail to trade with developed countries due to their differences in quality 
requirements which in turn reflect consumer regulation”.38 
Other authors like Henson and Spencer highlighted the impact of the WTO’s SPS 
Agreement on the extent to which SPS measures hinders exports from developing 
countries.39 However, in as much as their work is elegant and of great quality it also fails 
to venture into the WTO legal frameworks that can be used to deal with the effects of 
the SPS measures. Mutasa and Nyamandi as cited by N. Mupure in his thesis, also 
“assesses the degree to which SPS requirements impede exports of agricultural and 
food products from African countries”.40 Their approach is also problematic because it is 
purely economic as it neglects the current legal framework that regulates the use of the 
SPS measures and how to address the negative effects of these measures on market 
access in trade. 
Moreover, Lionel Fontagne, Mimouni and Jean Michel also analysed the magnitude and 
structure of environment-related measures notified under the SPS Agreements.41 Their 
focus of the SPS measures on developing countries and market access for these 
countries is only limited to environment SPS measures thus failing to look at the legal 
and economic impact of these measures. Their study is not of much relevance to this 
thesis as it mainly focused on the environmental perspective of SPS measures whilst 
this thesis aims at taking the legal route which seems to be ignored by many authors. 
Moreover, the report by Cerrex also identified the impact of the application of SPS 
measures by the EU on exports from ACP countries.42 However, their study is not water 
                                                                 
38 Murphy, K. M., & Shleifer, A. ‘Quality and trade’. Journal of development economics, 1997, page 1-15. 
39 S, Henson and R Loader, ‘Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries’: The Role of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements, 2001 (1), page 85. 
40 Mupure, L.N.A (2014) International Trade Law, “A Critical assessment on the Impact of SPS measures 
on Market Access for Developing Countries: Case Study of South Africa and Kenya. University of 
KwaZulu-Natal page 7-10. 
41 L. Fontagné, M. Mimoun & J,M Pasteels, ‘Estimating the impact of environmental SPS and TBT 
on international trade ‘, 2005, 1, 2. 
42 Cerrex Ltd, UK May 2003 
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tight as it fails to quantify the influence of these measures either in terms of how they 
actually may act as trade impediment on individual’s country’s export potential. 
Athukorala P and Jayasuriya S as cited by N. Mupure in his dissertation pointed out that 
“processed food exports to developed country markets have emerged as a potentially 
major new source of dynamic export growth for many developing countries in the recent 
years”.43 The reason for this setback is that the capacity of developing countries to 
penetrate developed countries’ markets critically depends on them being able to meet 
strict food safety standards prescribed by developed countries.44 They further argued 
that this situation leads to unpredictability in terms of trade. As such this raises 
suspicions that SPS measures are being used as “a non-transparent, trade impeding 
protectionist tool”, rather than as a legitimate instrument for the protection of human, 
plant and animal health.45 The purpose of the authors’ paper is to review the key issues 
related to the trade effects of food safety standards. The context of the paper however 
points to the “strengthening of global trade architecture for development”.46 As such 
these authors write from an economic and development perspective. This thesis 
critically analyses the issue of SPS measures and their impact on market access in 
relation to developing countries from a legal perspective. 
In this respect this thesis, aims at analysing the SPS measures and their effects on 
market access in relation to SPS measures and their effects on market access in 
relation to developing countries. Apart from that, and more specifically, this thesis 
shows what measures can be adopted to deal with the SPS measures so that market 
access for developing countries will be created. The legal frame work of the WTO that 
governs trade will also be discussed and examined to show how it operates to counter 
the effects of SPS measures on developing countries. 
 
                                                                 
43 P Athukorala & S Jayasuriya ‘Food Safety Issues, Trade and WTO Rules: A Developing Country 
Perspective’ 2003 The World Economy 1, 1. 
44 Ibid P Athukorala & S Jayasuriya  page 1. 
45 Mupure N. L.A (2014). INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, A Critical Assessment on the Impact of SPS 
Measures on Market Access for Developing Countries: Case study of South Africa and Kenya. University 
Of KwaZulu-Natal page 8. 




    1.4     PURPOSE STATEMENT (AIMS AND OBJECTIVES)  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of SPS measures on how they create 
obstacles for developing countries in their quest to access the markets of developed 
countries. In this respect the thesis has the following aims and objectives: 
1. To trace how the development needs of developing countries have been dealt with 
in the Multilateral Trading Systems (MTS). 
2. To understand the nature of non- tariff barriers, more specifically SPS measures and 
their effects on market access to developing countries. 
3. To highlight the problems that have been suffered or are likely to be suffered by 
developing countries due to the current implementation of SPS measures by 
developed countries. 
4. To recommend remedies on how these problems and concerns raised can be dealt 
with.  
It should be put in mind that,  the assessment of the effects of SPS measures on market 
access of developing countries will be achieved based on the case study of South Africa 
and its trading relationship with the European Union. 
 
     1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS    
 
The main focus of the thesis is to mainly assess the impact of SPS measures on the 
ability of developing countries to access the markets of developed countries; these are 
the following research questions: 
 What necessitated the change from GATT to the WTO? And to what extent did 




 To what extent has the MTS addressed the development needs of developing 
countries in respect of SPS measures, in particular? To what extent do SPS 
measures impede trade between developing and developed countries, in 
general? Has the SPS Agreement been effective in enhancing market access for 
developing countries? 
 What impact has the TDCA agreement have on the relationship between SA and 
EU? How has the EU SPS measures impeded market access for South Africa, in 
respect of the Citrus dispute and how has this effected the current trade 
relationship between the parties? 
   1.6  CONCEPTUAL OR THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This thesis will adopt a legal theoretical framework. The purpose of this approach is to 
conduct the research in a legal context namely under the realm of International Trade 
Law. Hence in assessing the impact of the SPS measures on market access of 
developing countries, this exercise will be undertaken using legal lenses.  
 
    1.7  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis will make extensive use of qualitative methods of research in pursuit of the 
aforementioned research objectives. It will be purely desktop research. This is the case 
because much of the issues related to SPS measures are found in codified legal 
instruments and this thesis will be conducted by referring to the already existing primary 
literature such as the relevant WTO Agreements; the Trade Development Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA) between SA and EU. In addition, reference will also be made to a 
number of textbooks, journals and working papers; policy papers; trade reports and 
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                                                            CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND 
TARIFFS (GATT) AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
After the World War II the countries focused on reconstructing the international 
economy. Part of the Bretton Woods institutions (now known as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)), proposed the formation of the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO). The main objective of ITO was to foresee a new multilateral trade 
system of liberalised international trade along with the IMF and the World Bank.47 It has 
been submitted that, about 50 countries participated in negotiations to create this 
organisation as a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN).48 The draft ITO 
Charter was determined to succeed because it stretched beyond world trade 
disciplines.49 The major aim was to bring into existence the ITO at a UN conference on 
Trade and Employment in Havana, Cuba in 1947.50 ITO charter was finally agreed in 
Havana in March 1948, but ratification in some national legislatures proved impossible.  
 
The overall plan after the war was twofold; first the idea was to give an early boost to 
trade liberalisation and to secondly begin to address the large overhang protectionist 
measures which remained in place from the early 1930’s. As such tariff negotiations 
were opened among the 23 founding contracting parties in 1946.51 It “was agreed that 
the value of the concessions should be protected by early and largely provisional 
acceptance of some of the trade rules in the draft ITO Charter”.52  As such, “at the 
International Conference on Trade and Employment held in 1946 at Havana, a proposal 
for establishing an agency called the International Trade Organisation (ITO) was made 
                                                                 
47 S. Chand: GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Origins, Objectives, Tariff Negotiations, 
2015. 
48 Ibid S. Chand. 
49 These world trade disciplines  included rules on employment, commodity agreements, restrictive 
business practices, international investment and services 
50 S. Chand (see note  47). 
51 R. Howse, MJ Trebilcock: International Review of law and Economics, Psychology Press 2005.  
52 S. Chand (see note 47). 
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with the miscellaneous and general objective of augmenting and maintaining world 
trade and employment”.53 Despite finally agreeing on the Charter at a UN conference on 
Trade and Employment in Havana in March 1948, it appeared as though national 
ratification by particular states proved difficult. A relevant example is when the United 
States government announced in 1950 that it would not seek congressional ratification 
of the Havana Charter (report suggest that the ITO Charter unfortunately never entered 
into force because even though it was submitted to the US Congress it was never 
approved). Thus, it appears as though these were the reasons for the demise of the 
ITO. One common argument presented for the disapproval of the new organisation was 
that it would be too much involved in internal (national) economic issues of particular 
states.54 
The tariff concessions and “rules together became known as the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and entered into force in January 1948”.55 Albeit being a 
provisional plan, the GATT, from 1948 until the establishment World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) governed international trade.  
Having provided the brief background, the main focus of the chapter is to determine and 
discuss the factors that necessitated the change from GATT to the WTO and the extent 
to which this change affected the multilateral trade system and the position of 
developing countries. As such, the chapter will firstly provide a discussion of the GATT 
and the rounds that necessitated the birth of the WTO. Secondly it will further look at the 
multilateral trading system, how it was changed by the development of the GATT to the 
WTO and thirdly the position of developing countries in terms of international trade. 
2.2 GATT  
 
2.2.1 HISTORY OF THE GATT 
 
                                                                 
53 R. Howse, MJ Trebilcock: International Review of law and Economics, Psychology Press 2009.page 
25-37. 
54  B Peter. Kenen, the International Economy, 1999 (1)  page 376. 
55 Ibid B. Peter. Kenen, page 376. 
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As noted earlier, the GATT was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade.56 
According to its preamble, its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis."57 It was negotiated during the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment and it was the outcome of the ITO.58 GATT was signed by 23 
nations in Geneva on October 30, 1947 and took effect on January 1, 1948.59 It lasted 
until the signature by 123 nations in Marrakesh on April 14, 1994 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, which established the (WTO) on January 1, 1995.60 
It has been submitted that the GATT was inspired by the success of the Agreement for 
international monetary co-operation61 “as reflected in the formation of the IMF, similar 
co-operation as reflected in international trade also was desired by many trading nations 
for expansion of world trade”.62 This was due to the fact that many people thought that it 
was healthy for world trade, and an attempt was made to relax the existing trade 
restrictions, such as tariffs.63  
As the name itself suggests, the General Agreement was concerned only with tariffs 
and trade restrictions and related international matters. It served as an important 
international forum for carrying on negotiations on tariffs.64 Under the GATT, member 
nations “met at regular intervals to negotiate agreements to reduce quotas, tariffs and 
such other restrictions on international trade”.65 GATT, by its very nature, was a 
                                                                 
56 Trebilcock MJ (note above 53, page 25-37). 
57 P. Van de Bosche, “The law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, cases and Materials 
eBook Complete Collection, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
58 Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance, 2nd ed. 
(London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003), 258. 
59 Trebilcock MJ & R Howse, The Regulation of International trade, Psychology Press 2ed (1999) p25-37. 
60 Ibid Trebilcock MJ page 25-37. 
61 Ibid Trebilcock MJ page 25-37. 
62 Ibid Trebilcock MJ page 25-37. 
63 S. Chand; GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Origins, Objectives, Tariff Negotiation, 
2015. 
64 Ibid S. Chand. 
65 Ibid S. Chand. 
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contractual agreement among parties (or nations). It is a treaty that is collectively 
administered by the contracting nations.66 
Furthermore, GATT has served both as a legal institution and a forum for member 
nations to resolve trade conflicts. The GATT sought eight rounds of trade negotiations, 
in which all of them were successful and resulted in trade agreements that were later 
ratified and implemented by member countries.67 The major focus in earlier rounds was 
the reduction in tariffs on merchandise.  
2.2.2 THE GATT ROUNDS 
 
Much of the history surrounding the GATT was written in Geneva. However,  “it also 
traces a journey that spanned the continents, from that hesitant start in 1948 in Havana 
(Cuba), via Annecy (France), Torquay (UK), Tokyo (Japan), Punta del Este (Uruguay), 
Montreal (Canada), Brussels (Belgium) and finally to Marrakesh (Morocco) in 1994”.68 
The rounds in which trade liberalization was being negotiated can be divided into three 
phases. The first phase started from 1947 and it was the Geneva round, 1949 Annecy 
round until 1951 with the Torquay Round.69 Commodities which would be covered by 
the agreement and freezing existing tariff levels. The second phase encompassed three 
rounds, from 1960 to 1961 it was the Geneva (Dillon) round, 1964 to 1967 there was a 
Geneva ( Kennedy) round which covered tariffs and anti-dumping measures then lastly 
the Geneva Tokyo round from 1973 to 1979 which focussed on Tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, framework agreements.70 The third phase only constituted of the Uruguay 
Round from 1986 to 1994 and it extended the agreement fully to new areas such as 
intellectual property, services, capital and agriculture.71  
                                                                 
66  S. Chand (see note above 63). 
67 https://www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/agecon/trade/seven.html accessed on 01 July 2016 at 09.55am. 
68 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm accessed on 22 July 2016 at 
13.35pm. 
69 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm accessed on 22 July 2016 at 
13.35pm. 
70 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm accessed on 22 July 2016 at 
13.35pm. 




Since the ITO failed to be the multilateral trading system the GATT became the only 
multilateral instrument to regulate international trade during that period. It should be 
noted that the GATT played a pivotal role in establishing a strong and prosperous 
multilateral trading system that became more liberal through the famous rounds of 
negotiations.72 “By the 1980s the system needed a thorough overhaul there by leading 
to the Uruguay round and ultimately to the WTO”.73 These rounds of the GATT will be 
discussed in brief below.  
 2.2.2.1 GENEVA ROUND, SWITZERLAND, APRIL–OCTOBER 1947 
The Geneva negotiations in advance of the ITO's formation were motivated in part by 
the expiry of US presidential negotiating authority in June 1948.74 This first round 
sparked the formation of the GATT as it was the first round of negotiations which was 
held. “This first round of negotiations yielded a package of trade rules and 45,000 tariff 
concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about one fifth of the world’s total”.75 
However, by the time the deal was signed on 30 October 1947, the group had extended 
to a greater extent.76 The tariff concessions came into effect by 30 June 1948 through a 
“Protocol of Provisional Application”. Hence, the new General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade was born, comprising of   23 founding members (officially “contracting parties”).77 
 2.2.2.2 ANNECY ROUND, FRANCE, APRIL 1949 -OCTOBER 1949 
The year 1949 saw the emergency of the second round known as the Annecy round in 
which 13 countries took part in.78 Indeed this, round focused on the expansion of tariff 
reductions, around 5000 in total. Apart from that, primary purpose of the Annecy 
negotiations was to allow the accession of eleven other countries to the GATT as 
                                                                 
72 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattbilaterals_e/indexbyround_e.htm accessed on 20 July 2016 
15.43pm. 
73 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm accessed on 22 July 2016 at 
13.35pm. 
74 I Douglas A. “The GATT in Historical Perspective, “American Economic Review Vol. 85, No. 2, (May, 
1995), pp 134-135. 
75 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm#rounds accessed on 22 July 2016 at 
14.57pm. 
76 76 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm#rounds accessed on 22 July 2016 
at 14.57pm 
77 I Douglas (see note 74; 325). 
78 I Douglas (see note 74; 326). 
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contracting parties79. The original twenty-three members did not exchange tariff 
concessions with each other but did negotiate with the eleven new members of the 
GATT, and these tariff changes were generalized. This widened the geographic scope 
of GATT membership and provided for a marginal reduction in tariff levels.80 
 
2.2.2.3 TORQUAY, ENGLAND, SEPTEMBER 1950–APRIL 1951 
 
In 1951 the third round occurred in Torquay, England  and thirty-eight countries 
participated in this round. Furthermore, “8,700 tariff concessions were achieved totalling 
the remaining amount of tariffs to three quarters of the tariffs which were in effect in 
1948”.81 This third round saw countries cutting the 1948 tariff levels by 25% hence it 
was the only round which yielded appreciable tariff reductions. The third GATT round 
saw the original Contracting Parties again exchanging tariff concessions among 
themselves along with several new members acceding to the GATT, most importantly 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 
 
The Torquay round encountered two problems that accounted for much of its failure 
which included the dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom, and the 
growing disparity of tariff levels within Europe.82 The continuing dollar shortage in 
Europe prompted the United Kingdom to request unilateral tariff cuts by the United 
States, which the United States rejected on the grounds of the reciprocal mutual benefit 
criteria. The “two major countries (UK & USA) fai led to compromise, thus resulting in no 
bilateral tariff cuts on their trade”.83 This failure on both their parts directly meant that no 
one would benefit indirectly from their generalization. Koch argued that, 
  
                                                                 
79 These include, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, 
Nicaragua, Sweden and Uruguay. 
80 I, Douglas A. “The GATT in Historical Perspective, “American Economic Review Vol. 85, No. 2, (May, 
1995), pp 134-135. 
81 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/ fact4-e.htm accessed 22/07/2016 at 16.31pm. 
82 Irvin Douglas ( see note 80; 134-135). 
83 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/ fact4-e.htm accessed 22/07/2016 at 16.31pm. 
83 Irvin Douglas (see note 80; 134-135). 
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“this attitude unfavourably affected countries that would have 
reaped indirect benefits from such tariff cuts and made them 
cautious about granting concessions in their own negotiations”.84 
 
One positive result from Torquay was that all tariff reductions from the Geneva and 
Annecy rounds were renewed and extended until 1954 (and later extended again until 
the end of the 1950s).85 Widespread pessimism and frustration with the GATT process 
marked the end of the Torquay round. After a successful negotiating round in 1947 and 
a membership expansion in 1949, the GATT's momentum had suddenly stopped 
making progress towards facilitating international trade very early in the post-war 
recovery. After the difficulties at Torquay, more than five years elapsed before the next 
GATT conference, and the other one in Geneva in 1956 produced similarly meagre 
results. 
 
2.2.2.4 GENEVA AND DILLON ROUNDS: 1955-1962 
 
The fourth round took place in Geneva in 1955 and it stretched to May 1956.86 
Furthermore, about twenty-six countries participated in this round and an estimation of 
about $2.5 billion in tariffs were eliminated or reduced.87 “The negotiations started in 
Geneva on 1 September 1960 were named the Dillon Round, after C Douglas Dillon, 
US undersecretary of state under President Eisenhower, and Treasury Secretary under 
President Kennedy (who took office during the round in January 1961)”.88 This was due 
to the fact that he was the one who first proposed the talks and this became the fifth 
round. It has been submitted that twenty-six countries took part in this round. The Dillon 
round successfully reduced over $4.9 billion in tariffs, it also resulted in the discussion 
relating to the carving out of the European Economic Community (ECC).89 
                                                                 
84 K. Koch, International trade policy and the GATT, 1947-1967, (1969), Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell.  
85 Ibid K. Koch. 
86 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact4_e.htm accessed on23/07/16  at 11.45am. 
87 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact4_e.htm accessed on23/07/16  at 11.45am. 
88 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact4_e.htm accessed on23/07/16  at 11.45am. 
89 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact4_e.htm accessed on23/07/16  at 11.45am. 
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2.2.2.5  Kennedy Round: 1962–67 
 
This was the sixth round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations. In honour of the U.S. 
President John F Kennedy’s support for the reformulation of the United States trade 
agenda this round was named after him. This resulted in the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962.90 This Act ensued that the President had the widest-ever negotiating authority.91 
“As the trade rounds were getting longer and more complicated, the participation in this 
round included more than 60 countries”.92.Apart from traditional tariff cuts and new trade 
rules such as those on the use of antidumping measures were introduced.93 During this 
round, negotiations went beyond the subject of tariffs for the first time, resulting in 
particular to the conclusion of the anti-dumping code, the first multilateral GATT 
agreement on non- tariff measures.94 This round marked the formal recognition of 
preferential mechanism in favour of developing countries which was subsequently 
embodied in part of the general Agreement adopted in November 1964.95 It is within this 
round where GATT anti-dumping agreement was first introduced. 
2.2.2.6 TOKYO ROUND 1973-1979 
In 1970 the Tokyo round saw the first major attempt to tackle non-tariff barriers.  The 
Tokyo Round Agreements were signed on June 30, 1979 and the agreements were 
incorporated in the Geneva Protocol (1979), which contained the tariff concessions 
negotiated by a number of countries during the Round.96 This round made further 
progress in reducing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers as it also withstand another 
decade of GATT negotiations that was treading outside Europe for the first time. This 
Round apparently took a broader approach to the trade rules than its predecessor, but 
still it had mixed results. This round “aimed at reducing tariffs and it also established 
                                                                 
90  https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3621.pdf access3ed on 23/07/16 at 11.50am. 
91 S252 of the Trade Expansion Act, it directed the President to do everything feasible within his power to 
obtain the removal of the unjustifiable foreign import restrictions that impair the value of tariff 
commitments made to the US. 
92https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Agreement_on_Tariffs_and_Trade#Kennedy_Round:_1962.E2.80
.936 accessed on 23/07/16 at 12.56pm. 
93 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact5_e.htm accessed on 23/07/16 at 13.43pm. 
94 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact5_e.htm accessed on 23/07/16 at 13.43pm. 
95 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact5_e.htm accessed on 23/07/16 at 13.43pm. 
96 G. M. Meier; The Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Developing Countries, 
Cornell International Law Journal Volume 13, 1980. 
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new regulations aimed at controlling the proliferation of non-tariff barriers and voluntary 
export restrictions, which saw the participation of 102 countries”.97 This round led to 
tariff negotiations which resulted in further substantial reductions in customs duties. A 
series of agreements known as the “Tokyo Round Codes”, which were only signed by 
some of the participants were reached on various non-tariff barriers.  
Supplementary Protocol was opened in November 1979 for additional signatures and 
concessions. Most of the Tokyo Round Agreements entered into force on January 1, 
1980, although a few did so on January 1, 1981. Tariff reductions were phased in over 
eight annual stages, beginning on January 1, 1980; U.S. staged reductions for a few 
more sensitive products’ tariffs were continued through January 1, 199198. However, 
according to Meier, “the talks failed to come to grips with fundamental reforms in 
agricultural trade and stopped short of providing a new agreement on "safeguards" 
(emergency import measures)”.99  
 
2.2.2.7  URUGUAY ROUND: 1986–94 
 
This was the 8th round of the GATT negotiations, it was the most significant round of all 
the rounds that took place during the GATT negotiations as it marked the birth of the 
WTO. In September 1986, the Ministerial Declaration in the Punta del Este, Uruguay 
launched this 8th round of the multilateral trade negotiations known as the Uruguay 
round.100 Although the major trading nations had sought to begin another round of 
negotiations after the Tokyo Round Agreements entered into force, these efforts failed 
in 1982 when many countries proved unwilling to make fresh concessions to liberalize 
world trade at a time of world recession. After further efforts and several years of delay, 
these negotiations began slowly in 1986.101 
 
                                                                 
97 https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3621.pdf accessed 26/07/16 at 09.45am. 
98 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ fact5_e.htm accessed on 23/07/16 at 13.43pm. 
99 G. M. Meier The Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Developing Countries, 
Cornell International Law Journal Volume 13, 1980. 
100 CEA, Economic Report of the President, 1986, page.122. 
101 Ibid CEA Economic report page 122. 
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It was reported that there were fears that the talks were going to extend the trading 
system into several new areas, such as trade in services and intellectual property, and 
moreover would lead to substantial reforms in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and 
textiles (the stronghold of some countries). Interestingly, due to the plan to review all the 
original GATT articles, which was considered as the biggest negotiating mandate on 
trade ever agreed, four years was given to complete it.102 While all previous rounds had 
failed to cover trade in agriculture in any substantive manner, the Uruguay Round 
Agreements included an Agreement on Agriculture that covered trade in agricultural 
products on the same basis as trade in industrial products. Though previous rounds 
applied only to trade in goods, the Uruguay Round Agreements applied to trade in 
goods, trade in services, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, thus 
extending the multilateral trading rules to cover the technological progress and 
globalization of production that has been transforming economies since the Second 
World War.103 
 
2.3. EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE TARIFFS 
The GATT for 47 years played a significant role in the world trade negotiations. It is 
during this period when world trade was being boosted by 8% each year during the 
1950s and 1960s faster than the world economic growth.104By increasing the world 
trade, the GATT promoted world peace which was a great impact for the world at 
large.105 It should also be noted that, communication between the smaller countries was 
also improved as they were provided with incentives to learn English. This measure 
helped in reducing misunderstandings in respect of trading as all countries were using 
the same language. 
However, it would be an intellectual myopia to overlook the failures of the GATT 
because in as much as it brought about good outcomes, there are some disadvantages 
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it posed to international trade. Low tariffs destroy domestic industries, thereby leading to 
high rates of unemployment in those sectors.106  Governments subsidized many 
industries, especially the United States and European agriculture to make them more 
competitive on a global scale. In the early 1970s, the textile and clothing industries were 
exempted from GATT.107 When the Nixon Administration took the U.S. dollar off the 
gold standard in 1973, it lowered the value of the dollar compared to other currencies, 
further lowering the international price of US exports.108 This affected the international 
trade arena on the part of US as its international price of exports was lowered thus 
affecting the US whilst benefiting developing countries who depended on US exports. 
 
Moreover, GATT like other free trade agreements required nations to change their 
domestic laws to gain the trade benefits, “for example, India allows companies to create 
generic versions of drugs without paying a license fee”.109 This helped the people afford 
the medicine they needed. India removed this law to conform to international 
agreements, thus raising the price of drugs for its low-income population. Trade 
agreements, like GATT often destabilize traditional economies and countries, for 
example in the United States subsidization of agricultural exports can put local family 
farmers out of business. Due to failure of competing with low-cost grains, the farmers 
migrate to cities looking for work, often in factories set up by multi -national corporations. 
However, these factories can move to other countries with lower-cost labour, leaving the 
farmers unemployed.  All of these analyses can be deducted from the outcomes of the 
GATT trade negotiation rounds. 
 
The result has been a reduction from an average tariff rate of approximately 40 percent 
at the time GATT was created to around 4 percent in the early 1990s. Agricultural and 
textile products were notable exceptions to the goods covered in these earlier rounds.110 
The emphasis changed and broadened in the Uruguay Round: non-tariff trade barriers 
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received more attention; agriculture and textiles were included; trade in services and 
intellectual property was considered for the first time; the powers and structure of the 
WTO. 
 
2.4. WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) 
 
In January 1995, the WTO was established, but its trading system is half a century 
older.  As it has been highlighted above the GATT evolved through several rounds of 
negotiations, but it was the last and largest GATT round, the Uruguay Round, which is 
regarded as the most important as it led to the creation of this particular institution. The 
WTO would differ from GATT which had mainly dealt with trade in goods, as the new 
institution and its agreements (part of the single undertaking), would cover “trade in 
services, and in traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property)”.111 
 
2.4.1 PRINCIPLES OF THE WTO 
 
“The organization aimed at regulating trade between participating countries; providing a 
framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements”.112 In essence it is also a 
dispute resolution process dealing with participants to WTO agreements making sure 
that that they honour their obligations.113 Moreover, in many instances these issues that 
the WTO focuses on stems from the previous trade negotiations, especially from the 
Uruguay Round (1986–1994).114 
 
                                                                 
111 Understanding the WTO PDF can be accessed on http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-
e/understanding-e.pdf   
112 R, Rena, 2012 Impact of WTO policies on developing countries: Issues and perspectives. 
Transnational Corporations Review (Canada) (3) 77 
113 The Final Act signed in Marrakesh in 1994 is the cover note; everything else is attached to this. 
Annexed are the agreements on goods, services and intellectual property, dispute settlement, trade policy 
review mechanism and the plurilateral agreements. Schedules also form part of the Uruguay Round 
agreements.  




The WTO institutes a framework for trade policies, and it does not explain or specify 
outcomes.115 This therefore, means that it is concerned with setting the rules of trade 
policy game not with the results of the game. There are 5 principles that are of particular 
importance in understanding both pre-1994 GATT and the WTO: non- discrimination, 
reciprocity, enforceable, commitments, and transparency and safety values.116 It should 
also be highlighted that the WTO intends to supervise and liberalise International trade. 
 
2.4.2 PRINCIPLE OF NON DISCRIMINATION   
 
Fundamentally speaking, the WTO is built on the foundation of non-discrimination which 
has two major components: the Most Favoured Nation rule and the National Treatment 
Principle.117 These principles are the cornerstone of the WTO and they are of great 
importance to this thesis as they show how the WTO aimed to liberalise trade through 
the implementation of these principles and the extent to which the SPS measures 
impact on market access for developing countries. 
 
2.4.3 THE MOST FAVOURED NATION (MFN) PRINCIPLE AND THE NATIONAL 
TREATMENT PRINCIPLE 
 
The MFN principle entails that a product made in one member country must be treated 
no less favourably than a very similar good that originates in any other country.118 It can 
be submitted that, these two principles also strengthened the trade liberalization 
intended by the WTO as goods are being treated without discrimination. Hoekman 
further adds that, “if best treatment is accorded to a trading partner supplying a specific 
                                                                 
115 Understanding the WTO PDF can be accessed on http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-
e/understanding-e.pdf. 
116 Reciprocity entails reflection on both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise because of 
the MFN rule and a desire to obtain better access to foreign markets. Transparency is when WTO 
members are required to publish their trade regulations, allowing review of administrative decisions 
affecting trade and to notify of any changes in trade policies to the  WTO. Binding and enforceable 
commitments refers to the tariff commitments made by the WTO members in a multilateral trade 
negotiation and on accession are enumerated in a schedule of concession. Safety values require that in 
specific circumstances governments are able to restrict trade.  
117 Article 1 and 24 of the GATT. 
118Hoekman, B.M., Mattoo, A. and English, P. eds., 2002.  Development, trade, and the WTO: a 
handbook  (Vol. 1). World Bank Publications p41.  
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product is a 5% tariff; this rate must be applied immediately and unconditionally to 
imports of `this good originating in all WTO members”.119 MFN is also the best treatment 
offered to any country including countries that are not members of the GATT. 
Furthermore, in terms of National Treatment principle, article III of the GATT entails that 
‘foreign goods once they have satisfied whatever boarder measures that are applied, 
they should be treated no less favourably in terms of internal taxation than like or 
directly competitive domestically produced goods’.120 Therefore, it means that, goods 
that are of foreign origins circulating in the country must be accorded same treatment 
which is no less favourable than those that apply to similar goods of domestic origins in 
terms of taxes, charges and regulations.121 
 
MFN rule also applies unconditionally although exceptions are made for the formation of 
free trade areas or customs unions and for preferential treatment of developing 
countries.122 It is also of great significance to note that, this rule provides a guarantee to 
smaller countries that they will not be exploited by larger countries through their markets 
when times are bad. To further concretise the issue of non-discrimination amongst 
countries, MFN rule reduces negotiating costs because once a negotiation has been 
concluded with a country, the results are extended to all. 
This principle ensures that liberalisation commitments are not offset by tax imposition. 
All goods irrespective of being local or foreign are treated the same. Hence, thus 
providing a greater certainty that a conducive environment is created in which foreign 
suppliers can operate. 
 
2.5 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WTO AND THE GATT 
 
The main difference between the two is that, the GATT was provisional and its 
contracting parties never ratified the General Agreement, and it contained no provisions 
for the creation of an organisation. However, on the other hand the WTO and its 
                                                                 
119  Hoekman, B.M., Mattoo, A.(see note above 118 ; 43). 
120 Article 3 of the GATT. 
121 Article 3 of the GATT. 
122 B Hoekman ‘Global Trade Governance’ in T Weiss & R Wilkinson (eds) International Organization and 
Global Governance (2013) page 44. 
29 
 
agreements remain indefinitely unchanged. Apart from that, “as an international 
organisation, the WTO has a sound legal basis because all members have ratified the 
WTO Agreements, and the agreements themselves describe how the WTO is to 
function”.123 
Furthermore, another distinguishing feature is that the WTO has “members” whereas 
the GATT had “contracting parties,” underscoring the fact that officially the GATT was a 
legal text.124 It is also of great importance to point out that the WTO dispute settlement 
system is more efficient and prompt than the old GATT system and its rulings cannot be 
blocked. The WTO has introduced a trade policy review mechanism that increases the 
transparency of members’ trade policies and practices. 
2.6 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS  
 
The Bali conference was the Ninth Ministerial Conference, held in Bali, Indonesia, from 
3 to 7 December 2013, where ministers adopted the so-called “Bali Package”. In this 
agenda the major focus entailed a series of decisions aimed at streamlining trade, 
minimise delays at boarders, permitting developing countries more options for providing 
food security, boosting least-developed countries’ trade and helping development more 
generally.125 They also adopted a number of more routine decisions and accepted 
Yemen as a new member of the WTO. This therefore shows how the conference 
intended to improve trade facilitation which is one of the major principles of the WTO. 
This conference was the first multilateral trade deal to be signed since the creation of 
the WTO. The three pillars of the Bali package included trade facilitation, some 
agricultural issue and selected development focussed provisions.126 This conference 
was hailed as a success as it for the first time WTO truly delivered on its main 
                                                                 
123 http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/organisation/dofference-between-wto-and-gatt/40416/ accessed on 
27/07/16 at 10.53am 
124 http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/organisation/dofference-between-wto-and-gatt/40416/ accessed on 
27/07/16 at 10.53am. 
125 http://www.tralac.org/discussion/article/5348-a-summary-of-the-bali-package.html accessed on 
27/07/16 at 12.58pm. 




objectives. Beyond trade facilitation, however, achievements under agriculture, 
development, and LDCs’ issues are rather limited if not disappointing. The success of 
Bali also needs to be put into perspective. Clearly, it provided some much needed 
breathing space for the system but much more still needs to be done to effectively 
rehabilitate the WTO’s centrality in global trade governance.127 In other words, while 
success was a necessary condition for creating momentum and building trusts it was 
clearly not sufficient to fully restore the WTO’s fortunes, let alone to unlock the Doha 
Round. 
Furthermore, the Nairobi Ministerial conference was the WTO's 10th Ministerial 
Conference, which was held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 15 to 19 December 2015.128 It 
culminated in the adoption of the "Nairobi Package", a series of six Ministerial Decisions 
on agriculture, cotton and issues related to least-developed countries (LDCs).129 The 
Conference was chaired by Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, Amina Mohamed. This was also the WTO conference to be held in 
Africa. 
The Nairobi Declaration preserves the positions of all WTO members and offers a basis 
for further engagement to advance the negotiations in future, taking into account all the 
views.130 This conference also confirms the strong commitment by the WTO members 
to advance negotiations on the remaking Doha issues including all its three pillars 
namely domestic support, market access and export competition.131 
2.7 CONCERNS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH THE GATT AND THE 
WTO 
 
The Uruguay Round, as mentioned above, did not only lead to the creation of the WTO 
but also resulted in a shift in the North-South politics. It has been highlighted in the past 
that developed and developing countries used to be in opposite groups, although there 
                                                                 
127 WTO (2013a), Bali Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013WT/MIN (13)/DEC, 
(Geneva: WTO). 
128 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minst-e/mc10-e/mc10-e.htm accessed on 28/07/16 at 13.51pm. 
129 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minst-e/mc10-e/mc10-e.htm accessed on 28/07/16 at 13.51pm. 
130 Bridges’ Negotiation Briefing, LCD’S WTO MC10 (Nairobi, 2015), Volume 19-number42. 
131 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minst-e/mc10-e/mc10-e.htm accessed on 28/07/16 at 13.51pm. 
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were some exceptions.132 “In the run up to the Uruguay Round, the line between the two 
became less rigid, and during the round different alliances developed, depending on the 
issues (a trend which continues)”.133 Despite these concerns, one can argue that the 
GATT and the WTO have managed to bring together all countries in trade irrespective 
of their statuses. 
Most of developing countries have benefited from the WTO agreements to such an 
extent that they utilised the available opportunities to make gains.134 In addition, the 
Doha Agenda negotiations aims to improve the opportunities. In spite of enjoying the 
benefits from the trade agreements, developing countries face a number of problems in 
implementing the present agreements especially the SPS Agreement.135 These 
problems also include being charged exceptionally high tariffs on selected products and 
increasingly high SPS measures in important markets that continue to obstruct their 
important exports. Typical examples of these include tariff peaks on textiles, clothing, 
and fish products.  
Tariff escalation is also an important matter to be discussed as one of the major 
concerns of the developing countries in relation to the GATT and the WTO. It is “when 
an importing country protects its processing or manufacturing industry by setting lower 
duties on imports of raw materials and components, and higher duties on finished 
products”.136 After the Uruguay Round, the tariff escalation policy still existed but since 
then much improvement has been noted as a number of developed countries came to 
party and eliminated escalation on selected products. Since, the advent of the Doha 
agenda, in respect this issue, special attention had been given to tariff peaks and 
escalation to ensure that a plan is put in place to substantially reduce it. 
2.8. CONCLUSION 
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The WTO and GATT are historical developments in World Trading System and they 
played and still play a pivotal role in shaping the life of international trade. This analysis 
is of great significance to this thesis. The GATT through its rounds of negotiations 
helped in creating the WTO through the Uruguay round. However, during the trade 
negotiation rounds a number of tariffs were reduced and this was also advantageous to 
least developed countries as they managed to have market access of the developed 
countries.  However, it has been noted that the developing countries have accepted 
liberalizing their trade but they are also demanding access to the markets of the rich 
nations and for such countries not to create trade barriers by using SPS measures. 
There is a need for a better framework for bringing reforms to trade and it will be of 
benefit to the world as a whole to create a suitable environment for free trade.  
The importance of market access was also highlighted in the discussion of the concerns 
of the developing countries to the GATT and WTO.  In as much as there has been a 
determined effort to improve the development needs of developing countries in the 
GATT/WTO Rounds there exists a new threat to the market access of developing 
countries. This threat is in the form of proliferation of NTBs or NTMs which can be 
potentially used as protectionist tools. The NTBs that are the particular importance to 
this thesis are the SPS measures which will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 





                                            
                                                      CHAPTER 3 
A CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND 





“The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, also 
known as the SPS Agreement, is an international treaty of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)”.137 It was negotiated during the Uruguay round of the GATT and 
“entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995”.138 SPS 
measures were typically negotiated so that they would be applied  to both domestically 
produced and imported goods to protect human or animal life or health from food-borne 
risks; humans from animal and plant-carried diseases; plants and animals from pests or 
diseases; and, the territory of a country from the spread of a pest or diseases.139 The 
SPS Agreement’s major purpose is to regulate the use of domestic SPS measures by 
developed countries such that they won’t use them for   protectionist purposes. These 
SPS measures were only to be imposed where they were justified so as to protect the 
objectives of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).140 Furthermore, the Agreement balanced freedom of WTO 
members to set such legitimate measures and the objective of reducing trade 
disruptions.141  
 
                                                                 
137 The World Trade Organisation, Agreements Series; Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, prepared 
by the WTO Secretariat page 9. 
138 E, A Evans “Understanding the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, University of Florida, 
2004, Page 1-2. 
139  Simonetta Zarrilli, WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Issues for Developing 
Countries, 1999. Page 9. 
140 Article 3(2) of the SPS Agreement. 
141 Lain Sandford: Hormonal Imbalance? Balancing Free Trade and SPS Measures after the decision in 
Hormones, 29 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev, page 389 1999. 
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This chapter thus seeks to highlight the problems that have been suffered or are likely 
to be suffered by developing countries due to the current implementation of SPS 
measures by developed countries. It will further critically assess the SPS agreement, its 
history, purpose and its achievements and current failures. In order to achieve this there 
is need to firstly consider to what extent has the MTS addressed the development 
needs of developing countries in respect of SPS measures, in particular?  Moreover 
there is need to critically analyse to what extent do SPS measures impede trade 
between developing and developed countries, in general?  Lastly this chapter will look 
at whether the SPS Agreement has been effective in enhancing market access for 
developing countries.  
 
3.2 HISTORY OF THE SPS AGREEMENT 
 
In 1973 the Tokyo Round of GATT multilateral negotiation started in 1973 and it ended 
in 1979.142 Indeed it was the first major attempt by GATT to try and deal with non-tariff 
trade barriers and farm trade.143 The negotiations were successful in continuing GATT's 
efforts to progressively reduce tariffs.144 It also resulted in a series of agreements on 
non-tariff barriers and agreements on certain modifications and additions to the GATT 
system. According to Griffin, one of the very significant outcomes of the Tokyo Round 
was the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the 1979 TBT Agreement or 
"Standards Code").145 Irrespective of the Agreement being established mainly to 
regulate sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, it also catered for technical 
requirements.146 Hence, this resulted in food safety and animal and plant health 
measures, including pesticide residue limits, inspection requirements and labeling.147  
 
The SPS agreement entered into force with the establishment of the WTO on 1 January 
1995. There was a consensus that the time for reform of international agricultural trade 
                                                                 
142 R. Griffin: History of the Development of the SPS Agreement; Plant and Protection Division, page 5.  
143 Ibid R. Griffin page 5. 
144 Ibid R. Griffin page 5. 
145 Ibid R. Griffin page 8-9. 
146 Ibid R. Griffin page 8. 
147 Ibid R. Griffin page 8 
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had arrived when the Uruguay round started.148 The Agreement’s main purpose is to 
regulate the application of food safety and animal and plant health regulations. Zarrilli 
asserts “that the Punta del Este Declaration, which launched the Round in September 
1986, called for increased disciplines in three areas in the agricultural sector: market 
access; direct and indirect subsidies; and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures”.149 
Hence the SPS Agreement came into existence after the unfolding of the above 
mentioned events. 
 
Furthermore at the advent of the Uruguay Round, some negotiators suggested “broad 
harmonization efforts, based on the knowledge of international organizations”.150 
According to Griffin, several negotiators proposed that, all standards be based on 
scientific evidence.151 They further conveyed that, onus to justify SPS measures should 
be placed upon the importing country.152 Apart from that this was supported by others, 
who concurred with the harmonization efforts based upon the work of international 
organizations. They further, asked for “the improvement of notification and consultation 
procedures and for dispute settlement as well as special allowances for developing 
countries”.153  On the other hand, developing countries strongly argued for the removal 
of SPS measures that, according to them, acted as non-tariff barriers to trade.154  
However, such countries, did support “international harmonization of SPS measures to 
prevent developed countries from imposing arbitrarily strict standards”.155 Hence this 
highlights one of the major objectives of the SPS measures. 
 
                                                                 
148 Stewart, T, P, Editor (1993) The GATT Uruguay Round; A Negotiating history, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers,  Deventer, Boston. 
149 [GATT, BISD. 33th Supp. 19, 24 (1987)]The text of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration states, 
with respect to agriculture, that “Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in 
agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened 
and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general principles 
governing the negotiations, by: 
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can have on 
trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant international agreements” 
150 Griffin; History of the Development of the SPS Agreement; Plant and Protection Division, page 8-9. 
151 Ibid Griffin page 9. 
152 Ibid Griffin page 11. 
153 Ibid Griffin page 11. 
154 Ibid Griffin page 11. 
155 Ibid Griffin page 11. 
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According to Griffin,  
“the priorities  in the area of the SPS were international harmonization on the 
basis of the standards developed by international organisations, development of 
an effective notification process for national regulations, setting up a system for 
the bilateral resolution of disputes, improvement of the dispute settlement 
process and provisions concerning the scientific basis for the working group on 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary Regulations which was formed in 1988, and  
produced a draft text in Nov 1990”.156 
 
Furthermore, on the 15th of April 1994 Ministers from most of the 125 governments that 
participated in the Uruguay Round met in Marrakesh, Morocco to sign the deal 
concluding the Uruguay Round.157 “The final text of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures that was approved at the end of the Uruguay 
Round was largely based on the Dunkel text and fulfilled the general objectives set out 
for it in the Punta del Este Declaration”.158 In terms of Article 14 of the SPS Agreement, 
least developed country Members were allowed to delay implementation for five 
years.159 Hence the concern for least developed countries continued even after the 
GATT/WTO thus the inclusion of ‘special and differential’ treatment being accorded to 
them in relation to implementation of the SPS agreement. 
 
Additionally, the national food safety, animal and plant health measures which affect 
trade were subject to GATT rules since 1948.160 The GATT member government 
required clear rules in relation to the SPS measures as they were observed to be 
restrictions to trade. Indeed, the Uruguay Round’s major aim to minimise other possible 
barriers to trade increased fears that SPS measures would be used as a protectionist 
tool.161 However, the SPS Agreement was intended to close this potential loophole, as it 
                                                                 
156  Griffin ( see note above 150; 11). 
157 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm accessed on 11/08/16 at 19.25pm. 
158 Griffin. The SPS Agreement entered into force for most Members of the WTO on January 1, 1995 
page 10-15. 
159 The SPS Agreement art 14. 
160 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm accessed on 11/08/16 at 19.25pm 
161 Griffin (see note 159; 15). 
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sets more detailed rights and obligations for food safety and animal and plant health 
measures which affect trade.162 In terms of implementing the SPS measures, countries 
are allowed to impose only those requirements needed to protect health which are 
based on scientific justification.163  
 SPS measures must be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health hence, they should not be applied arbitrarily. Article 3.2 of the 
Agreement purports that these measures should not unjustifiably discriminate between 
countries where similar conditions prevail.164 However, in terms of Article 3 (3) of the 
SPS Agreement, “members may use measures which result in higher standards if there 
is scientific justification”.165 They can further, impose higher standards based on 
appropriate assessment of risks as long as the approach is consistent and not 
arbitrary.166 Both developing and developed countries are allowed to adopt different 
standards and different methods of inspecting products.167  
3.3 THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE FORMATION OF THE SPS 
AGREEMENT 
 
The rationale behind the formation of the SPS agreement is to enable protection of 
human or animal life or health. According to E. A Evans the main purpose of this 
agreement is to promote free trade.168 In principle mutual trade between countries 
enhances their national income by utilising their limited resources, thus trade facilitation. 
However when such trade encounters negative externalities or hidden costs (i.e. from 
importing harmful pests and diseases), acceptance of the general premise becomes 
blurred.169 Irrespective of that assumption, the SPS Agreement was thus promulgated to 
regulate these externalities so that trade facilitation would be achieved. 
                                                                 
162 Griffin (see note 159; 15). 
163 Dr Lukasz Gruszczynski:The Standard Review in International SPS Trade Disputes, Some New 
Developments page 1. 
164 Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
165 The SPS Agreement article 3.3 
166 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/spsund-e.htm accessed on 04/08/16 at 14.16pm 
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168 E. A Evans “Understanding the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement” University of Florida  
page 5..   
169 Ibid E. A Evans page 5. 
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Furthermore the negotiation of the SPS Agreement in the “Uruguay Round in 1986-1994 
marked a turning point in the development of multilateral trade rules and gave 
prominence to the issues related to agricultural trade and the risk of importing invasive 
pests and diseases and food borne illnesses”.170 The other reason that encouraged the 
negotiations of this agreement was “deeper integration of agriculture into the 
international trading system”. James and Anderson purported that, the intent of the 
Agreement was to ensure that when SPS measures were applied, they were used only 
to the extent necessary to ensure food safety and animal and plant health, and not to 
unduly restrict market access for other countries.171 It is therefore fitting to critically 
argue that the main reason for the promulgation of the SPS Agreement is to protect 
human, plant and animal health and life, with also the intentions to promote free trade 
and to regulate prominence issue related to agricultural trade. 
Moreover the agreement is based on five general principles which include 
harmonization which refers to the use of measures that assimilate to international 
standards guidelines and recommendations of international agencies.172 Equivalence is 
also one of these principles as it entails “mutual recognition of different but equivalent 
measures to achieve international standards”.173 Apart from that, non-discrimination is 
also another principle forming the basis of the SPS Agreement as is treatment of 
imports equally like domestic produce.174 Transparency also purports that trading 
partners should notify each other of the changes in their SPS measures especially when 
the measures are different  from international standards.175 Lastly regionalisation is also 
one of the four principles as it permits continued exports from clean areas affected 
countries.176 
3.4 ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR ARTICLES IN THE SPS AGREEMENT 
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The preamble of this Agreement sets out the main aims of the agreement and what it 
entails on doing.  
ARTICLE 1 AND ARTICLE 2 
 
This article states out the general provisions of the agreement as where it applies and 
when it would be applicable.177 It basically deals with the rights and obligations of the 
members to the SPS Agreement.  Article 2.1, entails that members are allowed to use 
the SPS measures as long as it is not inconsistent with agreement, hence providing 
members with the right to use the SPS Agreement.178 Article 2.2 only allow members to 
use the measures to the extent where it is necessary to protect human, plant or animal 
life and must be scientifically based except in terms of article 5.7. However, in the Japan 
Apples case, Japan allegedly imposed restrictions on its imports of apples from United 
States as they said the restrictions were necessary to protect against introduction of fire 
blight.179 The panel found that Japan’s phyto-sanitary measure imposed on imports of 
apples from United States was contrary to art 2.2 of the SPS Agreement and was not 
justified under art 5.7 of the agreement and that Japan’s 1999 Pest Risk Assessment 
did not meet the requirements of art 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.180 
Furthermore, it can be submitted that, article 2 allows member countries to use the SPS 
measures to the extent where it is necessary however, member countries tend to use 
measures as protectionist tools to protect their domestic producers from economic 
competition.181 Basically, article 2’s main goal is to guide against the misuse of the 
measures by member countries i.e. using it as a protectionist tool against developing 
countries but in reality it is doing the opposite.182  “Article 2.3 places obligations on 
members that their use of the SPS measures should not arbitrarily and unjustifiably 
discriminate between members where similar conditions prevail on their territory and 
                                                                 
177  Article 1 of the SPS Agreement. 
178 See Article 2(1) of the SPS Agreement. 
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that of another member states”.183 Therefore, application of these measures should be 
kept in line with international trade thus avoiding trade restriction. 
ARTICLE 3 HARMONIZATION 
 
The main key goal of the SPS Agreement is to encourage the harmonisation184 of SPS 
measures between Members. To this end the Agreement requires Members to base 
their SPS measures on "international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where 
they exist" unless they wish to impose a "higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection".185 "International standards, guidelines and recommendations are defined as  
“the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission relating to food safety as well as those relating to 
animal and plant pests and diseases developed by other relevant international 
organisations”.186  
Apart from that, article 3(5) provides for an “SPS committee”187 to develop procedure to 
monitor the process of international. 
ARTICLE 4 EQUIVALENCE 
 
 This article basically states that “SPS measures of other members must be treated as 
equivalent even if they different”.188 The SPS Agreement reduces the compliance cost 
created by the measures irrespective of whether no harmonisation - either because 
there are no international standards, or where a Member has chosen its own higher 
                                                                 
183 Article 2(3) of the SPS Agreement. 
184 SPS Agreement, Annex A - Definition 2 defines "[h]armonisation" as "[t]he establishment,  
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185 SPS Agreement, art 3. 
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188 SPS Agreement art 4. 
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"appropriate level of protection".189  Accordingly, a Member is obliged to accept the SPS 
measures of other Members as equivalent, if such measures achieve their appropriate 
level of SPS protection.190 
ARTICLE 5 ASSESSMENT OF RISK AND DETERMINATION OF THE 
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF SANITARY OR PHYTOSANITARY PROTECTION 
 
This article emphasizes more on the “issues of risk assessment as it purports that 
countries must establish SPS measures on the basis of an appropriate assessment of 
the actual risks involved”.191 Apart from that, members  should also upon request, 
disclose what factors they took into consideration, assessment procedures they used 
and the level of risk they determined to be acceptable.192 In order to do this scientific 
evidence, relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods are required.193 Article 5.3 
requires “Members to take into account relevant economic factors when determining 
measures to achieve their appropriate level of protection”.194 Article 5.4 encourages 
Members to: 
  
"take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects" when 
determining the appropriate level of protection. 
  
Additionally, Article 5.5 purports that the application of SPS measures must be at an 
appropriate level of protection, by requiring Members to avoid "arbitrary or unjustified 
distinctions as these would create discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade".195 
Finally, Article 5.6 requires Members to "ensure that [SPS] measures are not more trade 
restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate level of protection". It is important to 
note that the right of Members to impose SPS measures is qualified with words such as 
"appropriate", "relevant economic factors", "take into account the objective", "arbitrary or 
                                                                 
189 Ibid article 4. 
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unjustified" and "discrimination or disguised restriction". These above stated words 
shows that the SPS Agreement represents a document agreed between trade 
negotiators, each with different requirements and expectations in terms of desired 
outcomes.196 
Furthermore, the EC Hormones case dealt with the requirements of article 5. In this 
case “the United States and the European Community (EC) were involved in a dispute 
over the importation of beef from the United States into the EC”.197 Apparently,  the EU, 
“in 1988, banned the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production”, by 
subsequently (in 1989) implementing an import ban on such hormone treated meat.198 
The United States and Canada argued that “the use of hormones for growth promotion 
purposes in beef cattle was safe and posed no threat to human health”.199 As such, 
these parties contended that the EU's policy was not scientifically proved and was in 
actually a protectionist tool by the EU to protect its beef producers from competition.200 
Likewise, the EU countered this assertion by stating that “beef hormones might threaten 
human health and stated that science supported its policy”.201 
Furthermore, on August 18, 1997, “the WTO dispute settlement Panels, that were 
formed to solve the issues, released their reports”.202 In arguing before the panels, here 
the United States and Canada argued submitted that the EU's prohibition on the 
importation of hormone treated beef was a violation of its obligations under Article 3.1 of 
the SPS Agreement because the country failed to base its measure on international 
standards, as required by the provision.203 In critically analysing the implementation of 
the SPS measures it can be submitted that, the EU in this case used them as a 
protectionist tool.204 
                                                                 
196 Dr Lukasz Gruszczynski:The Standard Review in International SPS Trade Disputes, Some New 
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197 EC  measures concerning meat and meat products(hormones) original complaint by the United States, 
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WT/DS48/ARB 12 July, DSR 1999:III, p1105. 
200 Ibid EC Hormones case. 
201 Ibid  EC Hormones case. 
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43 
 
The Codex maintains standards for five of the six hormones under dispute. The Codex 
states that there are five hormones used in veterinary practices for purposes of growth 
promotion in beef cattle. They are not a health hazard to humans if they are used where 
necessary and according to the correct veterinary practices.205 The EU's measures 
deviated from the international standards of the Codex thus they were not in conformity 
with Article 3.1.206 Article 3.3 makes it clear that a WTO member is not required to base 
its SPS measures on international standards. As such Article 3.3 purports that members 
to this agreement may maintain higher standards than the international norm, only if 
such measures are scientifically justified. This is further allowed if also they operate "as 
a consequence of the level of sanitary or phyto-sanitary protection and members 
determines appropriateness in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 
through 8 of Article 5."207 Furthermore, article 5 states that “members base their 
measures on risk assessments” and this also supported the EU’s position.208 However, 
the panel deemed that the EU failed to demonstrate that its position on risk 
assessments as required in Article 3.3.The panels therefore submitted that “the EU's 
policy on beef hormones deviated from its obligations under article 3.3 of SPS 
Agreement”.209 
Subsequently, the EU appealed the findings of the respective panels, and the WTO 
Appellate Body released its report on January 16, 1998”.210 Although the Appellate 
Body's decision dismissed a number of arguments put forward by the panels, it 
considered the panels' conclusions that the EU's beef hormone policy violated article 
3.3 as it was not based on a risk assessment.211 The Body submitted in their report that, 
voluntary standards of international organizations such as the Codex has no hard fuss 
rule standards for WTO members meaning members can choose to deviate from them. 
It should also be noted that this case highlighted on how member states sometimes fail 
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to meet the risk assessment criteria stipulated in article 5 of the agreement. The SPS 
measures are obstacles to international trade as members to this agreement use them 
to protect themselves against competition in trade and this puts other international 
trading countries’ market access at stake. 
ARTICLE 7: TRANSPARENCY 
 
“Members must notify of changes in SPS measures and provide information on these 
SPS measures in accordance with Annexure B”.212 It should be noted that the members 
of the SPS Agreement have two obligations which are to provide information on SPS 
measures and to notify changes in the implementation of the SPS measures.213 Apart 
from that in the Japan Apples case,  
“the Panel relied on the standard set in the Japan Agricultural Products II held 
that, the measure at issue in the dispute was also a phyto-sanitary regulation 
within the meaning of annexure B (I) and as such was to have been published 
promptly in such a manner to enable interested members to become acquainted 
with them”.214 
Apart from that, it is of great significance to note that, the most important factor in this 
transparency215 issue is to note the changes that affects the conditions of market 
access for the product concerned. It would also be relevant to “consider whether the 
change has resulted in any increase in production, packaging and sales costs, such as 
more onerous treatment requirements or more time consuming administrative 
formalities”.216 
Annex B (1) publications of regulations, as every Member is obliged to publish all the 
SPS regulations that they would have adopted so as to enable all Members who are 
interested to be able to familiarise with them. In terms of publication, for a measure to 
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be able to adopted for publication three conditions should apply which entails, firstly 
that,  
 
“the measure must have been adopted’; (2) the measure is a ‘phytosanitary 
regulation’, namely a phytosanitary measure such as a law, decree or ordinance, 
which is (3) applicable generally”.217  
 
Annex B (2) entails the issue of reasonable interval and at the Doha Ministerial 
Conference Members agreed that, it should be understood as a period of not less than 
six months. Moreover, annex B (3) also explains the enquiry points and in the Panel 
in Australia — Salmon case, the panel found that “there was no obligation under the 
SPS Agreement for a Member to positively identify its chosen appropriate level of 
protection”.218 In the context of this finding, the Panel held that paragraph 3 of Annex 
B did not impose a “substantive obligation on Members to identify or quantify their 
appropriate level of protection”, but rather merely a “mainly procedural obligation to 
provide ‘answers to all reasonable questions from all interested Members’”.219 However, 
this decision was reversed by the panel as it held that, there was such an obligation. 
 
ARTICLE 9: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
 
This article purports that Members will have to provide technical assistance220 to other 
Members especially developing country members in any way.221 This assistance will 
help the countries to adjust and to comply with SPS measures which are necessary to 
achieve the appropriate level of phytosanitary protection in their export markets. In 
doing this the Agreement balances the rights between the developing and developed 
countries as it gives leverage to developing countries by facilitating technical assistance 
to them thus boosting international trade. 
                                                                 
217 Panel Report Japan-Apples paras 8.23. 
218 Panel Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 7.15 
219 Ibid Panel Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 7.15. 
220 Technical assistance is a form of aid given to less-developed countries by international organizations 
such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, individual governments, foundations, and philanthropic 
institutions. Its object is to provide those countries with the expertise needed to promote development. 




ARTICLE 10: SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
This article purports that, members should consider the special needs of developing and 
in particular least developed country members when preparing the application of the 
SPS measures.222 Furthermore, in reviewing the SPS Agreement, “the committee noted 
that it had no information on the extent to which this article had been implemented and 
encouraged members to further its practical implementation”.223 In terms of article 10.2 
of the agreement it is stipulated that, “where the appropriate level of protection allows it, 
Members should use longer time frames when applying the new SPS measures where 
products of interest to developing country members are concerned”.224 Indeed this is 
done so that, developing country members will be able to maintain opportunities for their 
exports. In reviewing the SPS Agreement, the committee lacked information on the 
implementation of this article and thus submitted that it should be applied where it is 
possible.225 This generates confusion as there is no certainty as to when this provision 
can be implemented and on what basis. 
 
Apart from that, in the Doha Ministerial Conference of 2011it was submitted that where 
the appropriate level of protection allows scope for the phased introduction of the SPS 
measures, longer time frame for compliance as stated in article 10.2 shall normally 
mean at least 6 months.226 Moreover, where the phased introduction of a new measure, 
fails but however, a member identifies specific problems. These problems may include 
(restricting market access for other members), members can enter into consultations 
after requesting, to try to find a mutually satisfactory solution.227  The committee can 
grant specified time-limited exceptions partially or wholly from obligations under the 
SPS Agreement to developing countries, considering their financial, trade and 
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development needs.228 This is of great significance to countries focusing on a two year 
programme to upgrade its veterinary inspection facilities, or their chemical residue 
testing laboratories.229 
 
Furthermore, article 10.4 purports that, “members should encourage and facilitate the 
active participation of developing countries in the three standard-setting organizations, 
often called the three sister organizations: Codex, Office International des Epizooties 
(OIE) and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)”.230 Indeed, most of the 
developing countries attend the meetings of at least one of these committee 
organizations, or comment on standards that are being developed.231 However, it has 
been stressed out that some of these international standards are often not appropriate 
for developing countries and their special needs. This is due to that some developed 
countries fail to implement these measures because of financial constraints and also 
time limits.232  
Upon realising the above, the Director-General of the WTO was tasked to regulate the 
standard-setting organizations as well as international financial institutions.233 This was 
done so as to identify ways to boost active participation of developing countries in 
international standard-setting activities.234 The three sister organizations have made 
efforts to facilitate developing country participation. “The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) has established a Food Safety and Quality Facility to help fund 
capacity building in least-developed countries and their participation in relevant 
standard-setting activities”.235  In addition to that the WTO Secretariat and the 
secretariats of the three sister organizations work together closely to facilitate 
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developing country participation.236 This is further seen, by the WTO-sponsored 
workshops on the SPS Agreement which are mostly organized in relation to Codex 
Committee meetings, and funds may be sourced by both the WTO and FAO to facilitate 
the participation of some developing country officials in both events.237 At the Doha 
Ministerial Conference, Members took noted the actions followed by the Director-
General to aid participation of developing countries in standard setting, and encouraged 
him to continue his cooperative efforts. 
ARTICLE 11: CONSULTATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS 
 
This article states that whenever there are disputes and settlements arising as a result 
of the agreement, the Dispute settlement understanding shall apply equally as it was 
applied and elaborated in the provisions of the articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994. 
Article 11.2 of the Agreement also stipulates that, “for matters that concerns scientific or 
technical issues, the panel should seek advice from the experts chosen by the panel in 
consultation with the parties to the dispute”. The appellate body in US/Canada 
continued suspension using authority from article 10.2. 
Furthermore, in Australia — Salmon (Article 21.5 — Canada), the Panel took into 
consideration that “the assistance of scientific experts in the original dispute was of 
utmost relevance, noting how valuable such expert advice had been during its previous 
examination” of the matter before it”.238Moreover, the panel sought to seek further 
scientific and technical advice for the 21.5 proceedings because the findings obtained 
included several new risk analysis reports.239 In the Japan Apples case, “the Panel 
having noted that the proceedings involved240 scientific or technical issues, consulted 
with parties regarding the need for expert advice. Neither party objected to the Panel’s 
intention to seek expert advice.”241 Hence it is therefore fitting to submit that article 11 of 
the SPS Agreement allows the panel to consult with the DSU in dispute settlement 
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matters, apart from that, if the matter concerns scientific and technical issues then there 
is need to consult with the experts for advice in relation to the matter at hand. 
Moreover, this article also states that, “the panel may, when it deems it appropriate, 
establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the relevant international 
organizations”.242 However, “in the In EC — Hormones, the Appellate Body agreed with 
the Panel’s decision to consider the individual experts reports other than to hear from an 
expert review group".243 It is therefore fitting to submit that, “due to these circumstances 
panels have resorted to consult experts on an individual basis, rather than create an 
expert group”.244 
Article 11.2 also allows the panels to seek advice from any international organisations245 
of their choice. This is evidenced by the EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products case which held that,   
“Although the complaining parties disagreed with the Panel’s decision to consult 
with international organizations, the Panel found it relevant to seek assistance 
from certain international organizations246 in order to clarify certain aspects of the 
parties’ submissions. The Panel considered that the concepts at issue “raised 
scientific and/or technical issues” in respect of which it might benefit from experts’ 
advice.247  
Article 11.3 also states that, rights of the members to this agreement will not be impaired 
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under any international organisations or any international agreements. 
ARTICLE 12: ADMINISTRATION 
 
This article complements one of the major principles of the WTO as it provides for a 
committee to be established, to carry out functions of the agreement and promote 
harmonization.  Article 12.2 states that, the Committee shall facilitate consultations and 
negotiations among members in all matters concerning the SPS measures.  Based on 
the proposals from Members, in 2009 the Secretariat prepared a “Proposed 
Recommendation Procedure (to Encourage and Facilitate) (on) Ad Hoc Consultations 
(or Negotiations) Among Members under the SPS Agreement (article 12.2)”.248 The 
Secretariat has been revised on several occasions, most recently on 12 September 
2009.249   “Article 12.2, along with articles 12.1 and 12.3, is highlighted in the second 
sentence of article 5.5”.250 In this sentence, Members are asked to work with the SPS 
Committee to develop guidelines to aid the implementation of the provision.251 Taking 
this article into consideration, the SPS Committee has adopted guidelines to facilitate 
the practical implementation of article 5.5.252  
Apart from that, the SPS committee implemented provisional procedures to guard 
against the use of international standards, and also agreed to review the operation of 
the provisional monitoring.253 “They also agreed on using the 18 month’s procedure 
after its implementation, with a view to decide at that time whether to continue with the 
same procedure, amend it or develop another one”.254 After a series of negotiations to 
monitor the use of international standards, “at its meeting of 27–28 October 2004, the 
SPS Committee adopted modifications to the provisional procedure to monitor the use 
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of international standards”.255 On “5 July 2006, the Committee adopted a decision to 
modify and extend the provisional procedure to monitor the process of international 
harmonization”.256 The committee shall remain in close contact with all necessary 
international organizations responsible for setting standards. 
Furthermore, article 12.4 states that, the Committee is responsible for developing 
procedures to monitor the process of international harmonization and the use of 
international standards.257 Therefore, it should set guidelines of these areas in 
conjunction with international organizations that have a major trade impact, for example 
when such standards and guidelines may apply and further on what conditions must be 
satisfied for imported products. Furthermore, it should be noted that, where members 
have not adhered to such standards they must give reasons for not complying with 
them. Members are obliged to provide an explanation as to why after revising their 
position in the use of certain standards or guidelines as a condition for import to the 
Secretariat and as well as the relevant international organisations. This is very 
significant in the sense that it prevents members from using SPS measures as a 
protectionist tool in international trade as every change to the standard applications 
needs to be explained. Article 12.6 also compliments 12.4 “as the committee will have 
to invite relevant international bodies or their subsidiary bodies   to examine the specific 
matters with respect to a particular standard, guideline or recommendation, including 
the basis of explanations for non-use given by the members as per request in 12.4”.258 
Furthermore, “pursuant to the provisions of on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is 
instructed to review the operation and implementation of the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures at least once every four years”.259  Hence there is need to 
review the measures and on how they are working every now and again as per the 
times stipulated in the Agreement, thus accountability on the part of members. 
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ARTICLE 13: IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Members are responsible for the implementation of this agreement, and they are also 
obliged to formulate and implement positive measures that cement the purpose of this 
Agreement. As such, it is stated in the Agreement that: 
“Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to 
ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well as regional 
bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are members, comply with 
the relevant provisions of this Agreement”.260  
In the Australia Salmon case “the Panel, read together article 1.1 and 13 of the SPS 
Agreement and found that, a measure taken by a regional government with Australia’s 
territory, was a measure taken by an other than central government body”.261 Hence, “it 
would fall under the responsibility of Australia as a WTO Member when it comes to 
observance of SPS obligations”.262  The Panel held that, it was entitled to consider 
whether the measures followed by the regional government were in compliance with the 
SPS Agreement.263 Therefore, “they considered that sanitary measures taken by the 
Government of Tasmania, being an ‘other than central government’ body as recognized 
by Australia, were subject to the SPS Agreement and fell under the responsibility of 
Australia as WTO Members in relation to their observance of SPS obligation”.264 
ARTICLE 14: FINAL PROVISIONS 
 
Despite the fact that the Agreement entered into force in 1995, “least-developed 
countries were permitted to delay application of the Agreement to their import 
requirements until 1 January 2000”.265 Developing countries were also permitted to 
delay the application of the Agreement, but only with respect to existing sanitary or 
                                                                 
260 SPS Agreement art 13. 
261 Panel Report, Australia — Salmon (21.5 — Canada), paras. 7.12–7.13 
262  Panel Report, Australia — Salmon (21.5 — Canada), paras. 7.12–7.13. 
263 Panel Report, Australia — Salmon (21.5 — Canada), paras. 7.12–7.13. 
264 Panel Report, Australia — Salmon (Article 21.5 — Canada), para. 7.13. 
265 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/sps_03_e.htm#fntext553 accessed on 
02/09/16 at 13.52pm. 
53 
 
phyto-sanitary measures on imported products in cases where they lacked technical 
expertise, technical infrastructure or resources, other than its transparency provisions, 
until 1 January 1997.266 Hence these developing countries will delay the application of 
the SPS when there is lack of technical infrastructure or shortage of resources. This 
right to defer application of the provisions of the SPS Agreement concerns, however, 
both SPS measures existing before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement and 




This annexure deals with the detailed definition of the meaning of the SPS measures 
and what they entail. “The Appellate Body in Australia — Apples case considered that a 
fundamental element of the definition of “SPS measure” set out in Annexure 1(A) is that 
such a measure must be one applied to protect at least one of the listed interests or to 
prevent or limit specified damage”.267 In determining whether a measure is an SPS 
measure in the EC Hormones case the Panel looked at whether various European 
Communities’ actions amounted to an SPS measure that would fall under the SPS 
Agreement.268  It further, looked specifically at the definition of a sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measure set out in Annex A (1) and explained that in deciding whether a 
measure is an SPS measure, regard must be given to such elements such as the 
purpose of the measure, its legal form and its nature and these are also explained in the 
annex A 1(A).269 
 
Annex C applies to the development of the SPS measures especially checking and 
making sure that the SPS measures adopted by Members are fulfilled. “The text of 
Annex C (1) (a) relates to procedures to check and ensure the fulfilment of SPS 
measures, not to develop SPS measures”.270 Furthermore in the US — Poultry (China) 
                                                                 
266 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/sps_03_e.htm#fntext553 accessed on 
02/09/16 at 13.52pm. 
267 Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, WT/DS320/AB/R para 7.148 
268  Panel Report, EC — Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products , para. 7.149.  
269  Panel Report, Australia — Apples, paras. 7.144–7.145 
270 SPS Agreement  Annex  C  (1) (a) 
54 
 
case the Panel found out that, “the SPS Agreement does not specify, or limit, the SPS 
measures referred to in Annex C (1). Indeed, Annex C 1) of the SPS Agreement merely 
provides that any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of SPS measures is 
subject to the provisions of items (a) through (i).”271 Hence it is within this context to 
submit that the annex C deals with the control inspection and approval procedures of 
the SPS measures, thus protecting the abuse of these measures as protectionist tools 
by Members. 
 
3.5 PROBLEMS WITH THE SPS AGREEMENT 
 
It should be borne in mind that, the intentions behind the SPS agreement was to protect 
flora and fauna in terms of international trade law.  It also aimed to achieve certain 
binding commitments in the following areas: market access, domestic support, export 
competition and reaching an agreement in SPS issues.272 However, this has been 
difficult to achieve especially for, developing countries as they find it difficult to attain 
such high standards set by the SPS agreement (SPS standards set up by the EU 
against the citrus fruits from SA. Hence, this creates exploitation, where developed 
countries seem to obtain and to be well equipped to utilize such SPS agreements, 
whereas developing countries struggle to implement these measures. 
Furthermore, the SPS measures on the face of it may result in restrictions on trade, 
although it is agreed that some restrictions are necessary for protection of food, animal 
and plant health. However, in some instances “governments are sometimes pressured 
to go beyond what is needed for health protection and use these SPS restrictions as a 
protection tool against domestic producers from economic competition”.273 If an SPS 
measure does not serve a purpose of protecting health of plants, humans and animals it 
can be a very effective protectionist tool and also a barrier to international trade, thus 
the need for strict compliance. 
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272 The WTO Agreements Series: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Accessed on 
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Apart from that, it should be considered that the implementation of regional and non-
governmental entities with regard to standardizing bodies creates conflict with regards 
to jurisdictional matters. Furthermore, what has to be asked is to what extent are these 
measures being enforced on countries? The major issue of infrastructure in developing 
countries affects the level to which SPS agreements may be implemented. Since, 
technical assistance is not obligatory, the running of SPS agreements would be a 
smoother process worldwide.  
From an analytical point of view, the SPS agreement was designed for countries with 
first world infrastructures, hence the implementation of such agreements would be 
difficult for developing countries as it makes it difficult for such countries to trade fairly. 
The end result seems to be that such agreements seem to promote free trade for 
developed countries, but impede it for developing countries.274 The question that needs 
to be considered is whether such agreements are merely used as a tool to promote 
inequality rather than ending it? 
Although in the Agreement it is provided that, technical assistance should be provided 
to Member countries, this does not happen in practice as insufficient technical 
assistance is given to developing countries.275 Henson and Loader have purported that, 
“developed countries takes insufficient account of the needs of developing countries in 
setting SPS requirements”.276 This is a flow in international trade because most of the 
SPS requirements are too rigid and expensive and to make matters worse, most 
developing countries fail to adapt and to implement these requirements as they face 
insurmountable difficulties in trying to do so.  
                                                                 
274 The WTO Agreements Series: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Accessed on 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries4_sps_e.pdf&sa. 
275 In terms of implementing the SPS measures the time limit  periods allowed for developing countries 
needs to be reconsidered as many developing countries are failing to live up to these standards. 
Examples include the efficacy of prevailing systems of the SPS controls, development of scientific and 
technical expertise and access to modern testing methods. 
276 Henson and Loader:  The Impact of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures on Developing Country 
Exports of Agricultural and Food Exports, October, 1999 page 10-11. 
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A case in point is the dispute between South African fruit exporters and European Union 
officials that occurred concerning EU phyto-sanitary import restrictions on citrus fruit.277 
The Citrus Black Spot (CBS), a common and benign fungal infection, renders the 
infected fruit unmarketable and severe import restrictions were launched in 1992 and 
2000 by the European Economic Community and EU respectively.278 From a South 
African perspective, these current restrictions are too rigid and are more stringent than 
technically justified, based on an increasing amount of scientific evidence upheld by the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DFF). Therefore, the application of 
SPS measures to SA’s citrus fruits by the EU could be argued to be a protectionist tool 
by the EU to its domestic markets. 
Apart from that, it should be noted that, South Africa is the world's biggest exporter of 
whole oranges and the largest shipper of grapefruit. However, since 2012 after the CBS 
was discovered the EU expects full compliance with the EU phyto-sanitary measures 
and a threshold of not more than 5 interceptions for CBS in one trading season have 
been set up.279 In case of failure, the EU would consider to initiate the procedure of 
safeguard measures against citrus fruits from SA.280 Considering the fact that SA has 
been the biggest exporter of fruits to the EU this somehow jeopardizes its international 
trade.  The DAFF in South Africa (SA) after some investigations alleged that the fungus 
cannot spread once the fruit is picked.281 Therefore, there is no evidence which 
supports the allegations from the EU thus, they might only want to protect their domestic 
markets from competition using the SPS measures. 
Furthermore, these measures that have been imposed by the EU has negatively cost 
many South African citrus growers as they lost almost fifty million after the suspension 
of all exports of organic lemons to the EU due to the risk of CBS. SPS measures surely, 
causes a lot of problems in developing countries because of the way they are being 
                                                                 
277http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/south-africa-and-eu-lock-horns-again-in-citrus-
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implemented thus hindering trade for most of the countries involved in international 
trade. ”The foregoing discussion suggests that SPS measures are potentially a 
significant barrier to exports of agricultural and food products from developing to 
developed countries”.282 According to Henson and Loader, a survey was conducted on 
the impediments of agricultural exports to the EU, many factors were raised and these 
are of most significance in hindering international trade. Altogether, the overall factor 
that was discussed and which was found to be the factor causing impediment to 
agricultural exports in trade was the manner in which the SPS measures are 
implemented by developed countries.283 This is because a number of developing 
countries are concerned with the manner in which the transparent mechanisms 
established under the SPS agreement are operating.284 
Having discussed the impeding factor, transport, costs, other technical requirements 
and direct export costs were also mentioned as aiding factors to the barriers of trade. 
Hence it is within this context that, one submits that, these highlighted impediments 
surely hinder international trade in developing countries as they lack financial stability 
due to the very high SPS standards that leads to many expenses. Moreover, country 
case studies conducted also highlighted the problems associated with the SPS 
requirements in EU that impedes international trade for example the SA-EU dispute 
where the EU imposed strict SPS measures on citrus fruits from South Africa. It has 
been pointed out in this chapter as a whole that, compliance resources, availability of 
technical or scientific expertise, access to information on SPS requirements and 




 This chapter critically analysed the extent to which the SPS measures impede trade 
between developing countries and developed countries and a number of issues have 
                                                                 
282 Henson, S.J and Loader, R.J; The Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The 
Role of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements, University of Reading, UK. 
283 S.J Henson and R. J Loader: The Impact of Sanitary and  Phyto-sanitary Measures on Developing 
Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Exports, October, 1999 page 5.  
284 Ibid Henson S.J and Loader,R.J page 5-6. 
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been raised and concerns that relate to the market access of developing countries into 
developed countries. It is evident from the analysis that SPS measures to a certain 
extent impede trade amongst countries and particularly developing countries. The 
support for this assertion can be drawn from the difficulties that SPS measures in 
general impose on developing countries in respect of implementation of SPS measures 
and the standard of care required in most cases is very stringent. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that SPS measures have the potential to be used to impede trade as observed 
by the disputes namely the EC-Hormones and Japan Apples case.285 Furthermore, they 
can impede trade since they have the potential to be improperly applied without due 
consideration of the relevant rules. Consequently, this problem hinders the market 
access of developing countries into developed countries’ markets. Another significant 
point raised was the susceptible nature of SPS measures which may result in their use 
as domestic protectionist tools. The CBS dispute between SA and EU is the evident 
case that explains more on how these SPS measures are being used to protect the 
domestic markets of developed countries. 
While the international community has tried to reduce the trade distortive effects of SPS 
measures through the SPS Agreement, many developing countries have failed to 
exploit opportunities offered by the Agreement due to lack of resources.286  This is due 
to the fact that the SPS standards are too stringent such that developing countries fail to 
implement them. Again this reflects the relatively poor scientific and technical 
infrastructure in many developing countries. Furthermore, developing countries are 
concerned with the way in which the SPS Agreement currently operates specifically the 
extent to which needs of developing countries is considered. This includes the setting of 
SPS requirements and the periods of time allowed between the notification and 
implementation of SPS measures. The SPS Agreement provides criteria in the use of 
SPS measures, but certain methods need to be found to facilitate the better inclusion of 
                                                                 
285 EC Hormones, Appellate body report, EC Measures concerning meat and meat products(Hormones), 
WT/D526/ABIR, WT/D548/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:1, 135 and Japan –Measures 
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developing countries when operating by also accommodating the needs of low and 
middle-income Members of the WTO.287 
However, it would be a travesty of justice to overlook at the problems of the SPS 
measures while completely disregarding the legitimate purposes of the SPS measures 
as the Agreement was enacted so as to protect plant and animal health and to ensure 
that the states’ duty to protect should not be encroached. In this respect the Agreement 
counterbalances the member countries sovereign right to adopt and maintain SPS 
measures with the need to promote international trade.  
The next chapter will focus on analyzing how the SPS Agreement has been effective in 
enhancing market access for developing countries? More specifically it will outline the 
specific impact of SPS measures imposed by the EU on the developing countries in 
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                                                         CHAPTER 4: 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF SPS MEASURES ON MARKET 
ACCESS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), which was entered into 
force on 1 January 200, between South Africa (SA) and the European Union (EU), was 
intended to strengthen co-operation in various fields and regulating agricultural trade 
between SA and EU.288 The objectives of this agreement are as follows:  
“to support South Africa in its economic and social transition process, 
strengthening dialogue between the parties, promoting regional co-operation and 
the country’s economic integration in Southern Africa and in the world economy 
and also expanding and liberalising trade in goods and services and boosting 
capital between parties”.289  
SA is the largest trading partner in Africa for EU. It should be noted that, “the agreement 
between these two parties provided for the establishment of a bilateral free trade area 
between the EU and SA in accordance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules290 and the strengthening of European development assistance to South Africa”.291 
Burger in his thesis purported that, “the main reason why South Africa entered into a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU was to enhance exports to South Africa's 
largest export market, attract higher levels of investment from the EU, and gradually 
                                                                 
288  SA- EU TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT: Published by Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Directorate, International trade; 2009. Accessed at 
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EXPORT PERMITS UNDER THE TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT 
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expose the South African industry to competition to ensure that it is restructured to 
become globally competitive”.292 
 
This agreement was negotiated to promote reduction of trade barriers in order to 
liberate trade on global basis. Furthermore, it was and is still of great importance to the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries as they will also be 
benefiting from the European Union future trade relations. It is within this context to note 
that, the trade liberalization between the EU and the South Africa is asymmetric 
because the liberalization period is different for the two parties.293  
 
Apart from that, Tsolo and others have submitted that, “South Africa has 12 years to 
fully implement the agreement, while the EU has only 10 years”.294 Furthermore, “South 
Africa was to liberalize around 86% of its imports from the EU, while the respective 
figure for the EU is 95%”.295 It was further analysed that, “the EU-SA TDCA covers 
around 83%  and 86.5% of South Africa’s agriculture and industrial sectors, 
respectively, while for the EU, the corresponding figures are 61.4% and 99.98%”.296  
This is of vital importance to note as it unveils the importance of the TDCA and its 
progress between the EU and South Africa in terms of reduction of trade barrier in 
intentional trade. 
 
On this note, this chapter focuses on the impact of the TDCA agreement in relation to its 
relationship between SA and EU. It will further assess the impediments to market 
access for SA because of the EU SPS measures in respect of the Citrus dispute and 
the extent to which this has affected the current trade relationship between the parties. 
                                                                 
292 Pieter Francois Theron Burger; the Trade Development Agreement between SA and the EU: 
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Currently, the EU is negotiating a series of economic partnership agreements 
(EPAs) with the 79 ACP countries.297 These agreements aim to create a shared trade 
and development partnership backed up by development support. Moreover, it has 
been submitted that; 
“in June 2016 the EU and South Africa, together with Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland, signed the Southern African Economic 
Partnership Agreement (SADC EPA) that regulates trade in goods between the 
two regions. Under the so-called 'SADC EPA', the EU has fully or partially 
removed customs duties on 98.7% of imports from South Africa while 
guaranteeing full free access to the rest of the signing countries.”298 
 
4.2 THE TRADE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGREEMENT (TDCA) 
 
4.2.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TDCA 
 
The TDCA is a bilateral agreement between the European Union (EU) and South Africa 
signed in 1999 after 5 years of negotiations, but it only came into force in 2004.299 “The 
Agreement was first provisionally applied partially in 2000 and was later on fully entered 
into force from 1 May 2004”.300 The main objectives of this agreement as stipulated by 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) includes,  
“promotion of co-operation between the EU and South Africa in a wide array of 
areas inter alia trade relations, development co-operation, economic co-
operation, social and cultural co-operation, political dialogue and co-operation in 
areas such as health and the environment.”301  
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The Agreement is a comprehensive one that establishes a ‘free trade area’ (TDCA, 
Article 5).302 As such, the Agreement largely deals with the movement of goods but 
there are provisions related to services and investment as well as other issues, such as 
government procurement, competition policy and intellectual property.303 Alfredo in his 
article submits that, “the strategic partnership is built on two strands:  
 enhanced political dialogue and cooperation on regional, African and global 
affairs; and  
 stronger cooperation in economic and social sectors”.304 
 
Furthermore, this agreement’s central objective is the establishment of a free trade area 
taking into consideration the objectives that have been provided in the TDCA. The 
aforementioned suggests that, “this agreement also provides  for the progressive 
abolishment of customs duties on listed industrial and agricultural goods over a 
maximum period of 10 years in the case of Europe and 12 years in the case of SA (i.e. 
until 2012) to fully establish the free trade area”.305 The ambit of the agreement is 
extensive in that it covers “95 % of the EU's imports from SA and 86 % of South Africa's 
imports from the EU”.306 
 
Apart from that, it appears as though, the partnership has been consolidated over the 
past 13 years along economic lines. Moreover, while enhanced political dialogue is the 
cornerstone for cooperation, others matters such as democracy, human rights, peace 
and security, forms part of this unique partnership.  307 It has been submitted that, “trade 
between South Africa and the EU amounted to 39 billion euros in 2010, with more than 
50% of the country’s exports to the EU being processed and semi-processed goods”.308 
Moreover, according to Hengari “SA is the EU’s 13th largest trading partner, and it also 
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accounts for a third of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)”309. Thus, it 
is not surprising that SA is the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa whose relations with 
the EU are at the level of a strategic partnership, although the EU has, in recent times, 
also identified Nigeria as a possible strategic part. 
 
4.2.2 PHASES OF THE TDCA AGREEMENT 
 
Relations between SA and the EU have increased significantly, following SA transition 
to democracy in 1994.310  According to DIRCO, “SA and the EU in the mid-nineties 
identified the need to enter into a broad framework agreement that would cover all 
spheres of cooperation, which ultimately led to the signing of the SA-EU Trade, 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)”.311  
 
The TDCA succeeded, as the EU and SA entered into a more extensive agreement as 
they saw the need to further cement cooperation in order to help address the many 
global and regional challenges.312 This led to the adoption in Brussels on 14 May 2007 
of the SA-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan (JAP).313 This Strategic 
Partnership “is built on the many shared values and common interests of the EU and 
South Africa and serves as an instrument to jointly pursue both parties’ commitment to 
promote liberty, peace, prosperity, security and stability in the world, and in Africa in 
particular”.314 This is very significant in the sense that, the implementation of this 
agreement is yielding great results for South Africa as a nation and this is facilitating 
international trade the main goal of the WTO.315 
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It has also been submitted that, “the SA exports and imports within the EU both had an 
annual growth of about 9% during the period 2011 to 2015”.316 In terms of all the goods 
that are exported from SA, “its exports to EU increased from R 151 Billion in 2011 to R 
216 Billion in 2015”.317 In summation of the role contributed by this agreement in 
boosting international trade, the total trade has grown by 257% since the agreement 
was implemented, which is very significant to both parties and the WTO. However, the 
EU remains South Africa’s main trading partner and the total trade ten months of 2016, 
exports went up 5.6 percent to ZAR 903.42 billion from ZAR 855.25 in the EU-SA 
trade.318   
 
Currently, SA and the EU work together at various levels and in many forums. Apart 
from trade and development cooperation, various dialogue forums address issues 
relevant to South Africa, the EU, Africa and the rest of the world.319 These include 
“dialogue fora on trade, development cooperation, environment, science and 
technology, space, energy, transport, health and migration”.320 These functional 
dialogue fora operate in addition to annual summit meetings and 6-monthly Ministerial 
meetings held at the political level.321 
 
4.3 SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TDCA 
 
According to Kruger, in “the past 15 years, South Africa’s economy has experienced 
vast growth and change in economic, political and social sectors”.322 The South African 
government has therefore strived hard to promote its strategic alliances with global 
superpowers. The country has continually sought number of ways to ensure that its 
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markets are available to foreign investors and aim to increase its connections with the 
first world. However, “opening up its trade borders has often come at a price, a price the 
developing countries have been willing to pay in order to gain access to one of the 
world’s biggest and most prestigious markets: the EU”.323 
 
Since 1994, “and political transformation and entry into the WTO, the South African 
agricultural and trading sector has undergone many changes, increasingly integrating 
itself into world markets”.324 This is of great significance in the sense that, South Africa 
sort to reintegrate into international markets after years of social and political exclusion, 
as this became the top priority for the South African government.325 This view further 
cements the submission that South Africa has the strongest economy amongst the Sub 
Saharan African economies.  Apart from that, South Africa's exports to the EU are 
growing and the composition of these exports is becoming more diverse.326 South Africa 
is gradually moving from mainly commodity-based products to more diversified export 
profiles that include manufactured products.327 
 
Franicevic further purports that, “in terms of agricultural activities, SA range from crop 
production and mixed farming, to cattle ranching in open wide plains, and sheep farming 
in the arid regions”.328 Therefore, due to these varied resources, “it is one of the world’s 
leading exporters of wine, sugar, fresh fruit, nuts, beverages, preserved food, tobacco, 
cereals, wool, meat, milling products, malt and starch”.329  Moreover, “South Africa is 
also amongst the world’s top five exporters of avocados, grapefruit, tangerines, plums, 
pears, table grapes and ostrich products”.330 However, SA exports mostly to the EU 
fruits, coal, coca cola, and non-metallic manufactured mineral products from the 
region.331 It is vital to note that South Africa's primary exports to the EU are fuels and 
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mining products, machinery and transport equipment, and other semi-manufactured 
goods.332 However, having said all that, agriculture remains the main sector that South 
Africa deals with in this trade agreement with the EU.  
 
For more than 100 years, citrus fruits have been exported from South Africa to all over 
the world.333 The industry has a long and successful history of growth, innovation and 
forward thinking. Since 2006, South Africa has been the second largest exporter of 
fresh citrus in the world, although it is the twelfth largest producer.334 The citrus industry 
has four sectors as defined by the main citrus types,335 and SA exports citrus fruits to 
more than sixty foreign countries.336 
 
In terms of grape fruits that are grown in South Africa, most of them are largely grown in 
the Limpopo province about 32% to 34%.337 In Mpumalanga, they grow about 30% and 
in Kwa-Zulu natal, it is about 20%.338 The bulk of the fruit is exported which is 
approximately 200 000 tons.339 Moreover, lemons are largely grown in Eastern Cape 
particularly in Sunday’s river area, which generates about 45% of the production.340 The 
Western Cape Province also produces at about 21%, then 110 000 tons of grapes 
which are exported every year.341 
 
Apart from that, soft citrus are grown in Western Cape, which produces 58%, Eastern 
Cape also produces 25% and there are small pockets of citrus up in Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga provinces.342 Of all this soft citrus produce, 100 000 tons are exported 
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every year.343 It is of great significance to note that here in South Africa two-thirds of 
their citrus productions are oranges and they are valencia and navels oranges. Most of 
the valencia oranges are produced in Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces whereas 
Navels prefer the colder areas around Marbel Hall and Groblersdal.344 
 
Thus the above, is indicative of SA’s citrus industry and on how i t depends much on the 
EU and UK in exporting its citrus fruits. This in essence, further outline the relationship 
between the EU and SA, as they are trading partners and on how SA has been the 
largest importer of citrus fruits in the EU. 
 
4.4 EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND THE TDCA 
 
The EU is the major key player in the global market in terms of international trade.345 
The “EU powerhouse of 27 Member States shares a single market, a single external 
border, and a single trade policy”.346 By working together as a solidified union, the EU 
has become the world’s largest trading block (partly due to its population of 495 million, 
which accounts for 20% of global trade).347 EU has superpowers status that are used to 
encourage less developed states such as SA to open up their markets thus it has 
increased the market availability of often-limited natural resources.348 EU has always 
experienced vast growth in citrus production and consumption all over the world since 
the mid- 1980s.349  
 
There has been rapid expansion in the production of oranges, grape fruit, mandarins, 
limes and lemons.  The citrus production within the EU has increased in the last two 
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decades. The large production levels have enabled higher levels of total as well as per 
capita consumption of citrus fruits. In addition to that, “rapid growth has been achieved 
for processed citrus products as improvements in transportation and packaging have 
lowered costs and improved quality”.350 
 
Furthermore, within the 2 decades stated above, Fidan asserts that, “production from 
oranges and mandarin rose in the EU in this period approximately 55%, this totaled to 
over 8 million tons”.351 The entire citrus production in the EU concerning oranges and 
mandarins constitutes 83%, lemons and limes 16% and the remainder is 1%. Moreover, 
the fact that, consumption of fresh oranges and mandarin in EU increased during the 
last two decades by 54%, it is higher than the normal production period. However, the 
domestic supply is 44.6% that means that the EU is dependent outside on orange and 
mandarin yields. Hence, this proves what has been submitted by Chadwick that South 
Africa has been the second largest exporter of fresh citrus in the world, thus EU is 
dependent on that.  
 
Apart from that, EU is rated amongst the top five largest importers of citrus fruits 
meaning that it plays a pivotal role in the citrus industry and many analysts have 
evidenced this.352  Its policies in the citrus sectors have recently changed in a number of 
ways in recent years. As such, Fidan submits that, the “Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture required the EU to reduce its tariffs and adjust the former reference price 
system in accordance with ‘tariffication’”. 353 In addition, the WTO agreed to a Special 
Safeguard Clause354 for products subject to tariffication, and the EU has introduced 
related changes into its trade regime for citrus products.355 Moreover, “the TDCA 
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specifies new rules on sanitary and phytosanitary measures in terms of the EU trade 
industry”.356 
 
It should be noted that, “the EU is made up of the superpowers of Europe and this has 
enabled it to hold a dominant position within the international trading system and, more 
importantly, the WTO”.357 It is evident that from GATT through to the establishment of 
the WTO, the EU has played and continuous to play a pivotal role in influencing 
international trade through its numerous trade agreements with other developed 
countries and more importantly the developing and least developed countries. This 
stronghold, has allowed it to affect the outcome of trade disputes and settlements, more 
so it has also permitted the EU to thus manipulate the international trade framework. 
Following the transition to democracy in 1994, Fidan thus notes, “the fact that the EU 
has the ability to initiate and change international trade policies, as opposed to simply 
reacting to them, affords it a rather large amount of advantage within the global 
economy”.358 Furthermore, in terms of the agricultural sectors of the EU, economists 
regard extreme forms of trade protection by developed countries as anomaly. 
“Economists further argue that the nature of trade and market supply is vastly distorted, 
as countries are denied the ability to trade the agricultural products that they have a 
natural comparative advantage in producing”.359 As such these kind of subsidies are 
detrimental and thus at the expense of the consumer and taxpayer.360 
 
4.5 SA-EU CITRUS DISPUTE 
 
A dispute between South African fruit exporters and EU officials surfaced concerning 
EU phytosanitary import restrictions on citrus fruit’.361 The “Citrus Black Spot (CBS), a 
common and benign fungal infection, renders the infected fruit unmarketable and severe 
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import restrictions were launched in 1992 and 2000 by the European Economic 
Community and EU respectively”.362  
The EU took steps to prohibit imports of SA citrus fruits such that it avoids 
contamination, as it feared the Citrus Black Spot (CBS).363 The EU thus imposed the 
ban arguing that the CBS is a fungal blight disease, which causes black blemishes to 
grow on the outsides of the citrus fruits. In imposing the ban, the EU purported that it 
was protecting its plants, animal and human health thereby relying on the SPS 
Agreement. 
Furthermore, in 2013 the ban was likely to have virtually no impact on trade as it 
exclusively applied to imports harvested over the period 2012-2013.364 The impact of 
the SPS measures as used by the EU on the ability of developing countries to access 
its market was evident in the 2013 ban of SA citrus exports to the EU markets.365   
There existed threats from the EU to extend the ban should the risk of spreading 
persist.366 “The South African government was strongly against closure of EU borders to 
its exports for lack of conclusive scientific evidence as to the likelihood of the fungus 
spreading from picked fruit”.367 Such a ban based on “a SPS measure that has the 
effect of impeding South Africa’s access into the European markets reflects a greater 
problem that is also affecting the greater part of other developing countries in terms of 
international trade”.368  
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This ban according to the South African view, “its restrictions are more stringent than 
technically justified, based on an increasing amount of scientific evidence upheld by the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF)”.369 Based on reports, it 
appears as though, that the SPS measures by the EU are too strict to such an extent 
that they impede South Africa’s market access in trade. Instead of protecting human 
and plant life, the SPS measures by the EU are unjustly hindering SA’s access to 
market.  According to the investigations conducted by the DAFF, the alleged fungus 
cannot spread once the fruit is picked.370 However, “in response a scientific study by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) reported that the biological data provided by 
South Africa did not offer sufficient detail to decide whether contamination could occur 
at the point of wholesale”.371 From an analytical point of view, it is therefore fitting to 
submit that this import ban by the EU is an SPS measure that is used by the EU as a 
protectionist tool for its own benefit rather than for phytosanitary concerns. 
Apart from that, it is submitted that, “since 2012 the EU expects full compliance with the 
EU phytosanitary measures and a threshold of not more than 5 interceptions of the CBS 
in one trading season has been set up”.372 Further, in case of failure the EU would 
consider to initiate the procedure of safeguard measures against citrus fruits from SA. 
Mupure in his thesis also purported that,  
“these EU regulations unjustifiably limit the market access for SA to the EU since 
the CBS fungal disease carries no health hazards to consumers or non-infected 
orchards as contemplated by the SPS Agreement”.373 “The SPS Agreement 
stipulates that an SPS regulation should be set up by a Member country to 
protect human or animal life or health from food-borne risks or pests and/or 
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diseases”.374 “Moreover, for some SA citrus exporters these EU regulations are 
impossible” to meet yet the EU mandates compliance despite the regulations’ 
lack of a scientific basis.375 
Furthermore, it has been highlighted that, “South Africa’s citrus industry is valued at 
about 6.5 billion rand ($733 million) according to the government, and Europe is one of 
the country’s largest export markets”.376 SA is the world’s biggest exporter of oranges 
and the largest shipper of grape fruit.377 It should be noted further that, “in a draft 
scientific opinion published by the EFSA it was concluded that the chances of CBS 
affecting the EU were “moderately likely”.378 However, this opinion was criticised by 
CBS experts as being full of “factual errors and omissions owing to the fact that there is 
no recorded case of the disease ever having spread via fruit exports”.379  
According to a recent EFSA scientific report on the risk of CBS, “there is a high level of 
uncertainty due to a lack of knowledge over how the disease would respond to the EU 
climate”.380 The EFSA report reasoned that considering that eradication and 
containment of CBS are difficult, SPS measures should focus on preventing entry.381 
Such an opinion points towards the exclusion of SA citrus exports from the EU market. 
This is particularly problematic since these EU SPS regulations negatively impact on the 
market access of SA (in particular) into the EU. 
Moreover, these phytosanitary measures by the EU have been challenged on so many 
grounds by the South African citrus growers and trade officials. They have argued that 
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the “CBS report is based on shaky methodological grounds because the South African 
Citrus Growers Association (CGA) characterised the risk levels defined by the EU as 
both arbitrary and unscientific in nature”.382 Chadwick is of the view that, “the level set 
by the EU has no technical or scientific basis and is tantamount to threatening market 
closure”.383 He further submitted that, ‘CBS is a disease caused by fungus Guignardia 
Citricarpa and it only affects the appearance of the fruit, thus the report by the EFSA is 
likely to be of no accuracy but rather aimed at protecting the EU domestic markets’.384 
Moreover, Chadwick has pointed out that, many rural economies will suffer, jobs will be 
lost, downstream business such as transport packaging and ports will suffer.385 This is 
due to the fact that, growers are of the view that the CBS issue is an industry ending 
event. “The movement of banning citrus fruits from SA by the EU pose a risk of the fruit 
moving to other markets thus destabilising these delicately balanced markets and 
returns will plummet and growers will be out of business”.386 
Furthermore, the Investment Solutions’ Chief Economist, Chris Hart purported that, 
“China, India and Brazil are big enough for them to say, “well you do that and we 
can retaliate and that actually makes quite a big difference”. Whereas South 
Africa is quite small so if we retaliate they will say ‘well so what?’ Hence this is 
the hassle  but I don’t think we can use our multilateral platforms and the BRICS 
platform and see if there can be a more balanced approach to this so that you 
can’t just have the Europeans acting unilaterally”.387 
From an analytical point of view, it is of great significance to note that the SPS 
measures imposed by the EU are mainly aimed at protecting its own interests especially 
the domestic markets. Hart further said, “that the threat against the Citrus wouldn’t be 
surprising because it aims at protecting the Spanish citrus industry and it’s across 
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agricultural products whether its grains or in meat”.388  He has also characterised the 
EU as having tendencies of wanting to access other markets freely however restricting 
access to their own economy, thus showing its protectionist behaviour. 
Furthermore, Mupure in his thesis submitted that, the current EU-EFSA regulations can 
be challenged on a number of grounds.  
Firstly, the “scientific values used by EFSA are questionable… its criteria to 
assess the risk for entry, spread and establishment of a disease are very likely, 
and very unlikely, but never no risk”. Secondly, “South Africa is not the only 
country with black-spot issues, yet the EU focuses on South Africa, perhaps 
because it is the main competition for Spanish producers, whose season 
overlaps with that of South Africa. There are reasonable grounds for 
discrimination as contemplated by the SPS Agreement”. Lastly “in terms of WTO 
rules, countries have to try to “regionalise” their trade restrictions. If the scientific 
assessment shows there is a risk of spread or establishment in a certain region, 
but not in others, there is no justification for introducing trade restrictions in all the 
regions”389 
In analysing the above assertion, it is vital to submit that, the EU-EFSA regulations, 
lacks certainty in the sense that their criteria in assessment of risk is likely, unlikely or 
never risk which is a disadvantage to SA as there is no stipulated risk assessment 
criteria. These regulations also seem to be more stringent on SA considering the fact 
that SA is not the only trading partner to the EU and also not the only country with citrus 
black spots issues.390 The EU therefore is using these regulations as a protectionist 
tool. 
As pointed out earlier, evidence suggests that the EU’s current regulations are not 
based on science as required by the SPS Agreement,391 which is  particularly 
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problematic for the SA Citrus exporters as they had gone to great lengths and cost to 
ensure compliance with EU requirements namely new testing regimes and a 
comprehensive CBS risk management programme. “More concerning is the fact that 
despite the efforts rendered by SA to deal with EU’s regulations no agreement has been 
reached with the EU since 1992 on the risk of CBS’ transmission to EU citrus orchards 
via fruit exports”.392 Although the current ban is voluntary this does not in any way 
positively impact on SA’s market access to the EU. It could be further argued that such 
a decision by the SA citrus growers is merely a compromise to maintain the possibility 
of future market access into the EU. 
Fabricius has submitted that, EU and SA scientists are still arguing over whether or not 
CBS could infect European citrus plants..393 Apparently it is important to note “that 
exports from South Africa continue under strict controls to prevent fruit with the black 
spot on its skin entering the EU market”.394 A vast majority of “SA citrus growers ceased 
exporting their citrus fruits to the EU because too many CBS infected fruits bound for 
exports were being discovered”.395 Although, the current ban is voluntary this does not 
in any way positively impact on SA’s market access to the EU.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter outlined the TDCA agreement and its impact on SA and EU, it further 
ventured into the citrus dispute between the EU and SA and on how it affected market 
access of SA. The TDCA may be considered a success when considered against 
objectives to support the efforts made by South Africa “to consolidate the economic and 
social foundations of its transition process and promote the expansion and reciprocal 
liberalisation of mutual trade in goods, services and capital”.396  
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From the discussion, it appears, as though, the TDCA is a comprehensive agreement 
formalising South Africa's relationship with the European Union over the long term. It 
presents unique challenges and opportunities for the country and for the region. It 
further represents an important milestone in the development of South Africa's trade 
policy, moving the country a long way towards a deregulated and liberalized trading 
environment. This new environment presents unique challenges to the South African 
agricultural economist. 
 
Furthermore, the outbreak of the citrus dispute between SA and EU has been 
considered in the sense that, the ban of citrus fruits into the EU markets due to the CBS 
also impeded SA’s access to market in international trade. The SPS measures imposed 
by the EU are too stringent and not scientifically proven according to several reports 
discussed above. One might come to an inference that, EU SPS measures are not 
fulfilling the purpose of protecting plant, animal and human lives but rather used as a 
protectionist tool by the EU for its own markets. Hence, it is thus the argument that, SPS 
measures impede market access for developing countries in particular South Africa. 
Moreover, despite the appeal of Article 5 (4) of the SPS Agreement that Member 
countries adopt the least trade distorting measures, EU actions appear to be the 
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                                                          CHAPTER   5:   
                                   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Throughout this thesis it has been highlighted by the many authors in the field of 
international trade that, SPS measures are major barriers for developing countries in 
terms of agricultural international trade. As it has been identified by Chadwick the EU is 
leading on the issue of using these technical standards in their market in terms of trade, 
but however they are saving a different purpose.397 Apart from that, it has been 
identified in the preceding chapters that the SPS measures can be a serious 
impediment to the objectives of the WTO when used as protectionist tool by developed 
countries. Developing countries in particular experience problems in meeting the SPS 
requirements of developed countries and it has been proven that this can seriously 
prevent their ability to export especially agricultural and food products.  
Thus, attempts have been made to reduce the trade impairing effects of SPS measures, 
within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the SPS Agreement. However, 
according to Henson and Loader “current initiatives fail to address many of the key 
problems experienced by developing countries”.398  
The thesis intended to seek answers for the research questions identified in each of the 
chapters. Firstly, chapter two addressed the question of what necessitated the change 
from GATT to the WTO and to what extent this change affected the multilateral trade 
system and the position of developing countries. Secondly, chapter three assessed the    
extent to which the MTS addressed the development needs of developing countries in 
respect of SPS measures, in particular. It further analysed the extent to which the SPS 
measures impede trade between developing and developed countries. More so the 
chapter dealt with the effectiveness of the SPS agreement in enhancing market access 
for developing countries. Thirdly chapter four addressed the impact of the TDCA 
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agreement on the relationship between SA and EU. It also discussed how the EU SPS 
measures impeded market access for South Africa in respect of the Citrus dispute, and 
how this affected the current trade relationship between the parties.  Henceforth, this 
chapter will focus on concluding the findings of this thesis in terms of the problems 
imposed by the SPS measures and it will further proffer recommendations that need to 
be adopted so as to deal with these issues. 
5.2 FINDINGS  
 
This thesis has highlighted a number of issues “that need to be addressed by 
international institutions such as the WTO and the International standards 
organisations, developed countries that implement SPS requirements as well as 
developing countries themselves”.399 It was highlighted that the main objectives of the 
SPS measures is to protect human, plant and animal health and also to improve the 
current human health, animal health, and phytosanitary situation of all Member 
countries. However, despite the fact that SPS measures help countries to protect their 
human, animal and plant life, the way in which the agreement is interpreted by 
developing countries hinders trade to these countries, like South Africa. It is also noted 
that these non-tariff barriers may create problems that can be as serious as the actual 
tariff since duty rates charged at country boarders are very high. Interestingly, SPS 
measures theoretically speaking are there to protect trade however in practice they turn 
to be impediments to trade for developing countries as they are failing to meet the 
requirements in developed countries in applying these measures. 
Furthermore, a number of developing countries (such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, South 
Africa, Zambia, Kenya etc.) “consider SPS requirements to be one of the greatest 
impediment to trade in agricultural and food products, particularly in the case of the 
EU”.400 This is due to the fact that SPS requirements adopted by developed countries 
are usually costly and difficult for developing countries to comply with.401 As was 
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highlighted, the problem of non-compliance with such requirements has spill-over 
effects on developing countries’ ability to penetrate developed countries’ markets and/or 
maintain their position in those markets. Such a problem is made more apparent by 
developing countries lack of adequate infrastructure, financial resources and technical 
expertise to comply with the developed countries’ SPS requirements. Even more, in 
circumstances where compliance is adhered to, the timeframe for compliance is often 
unreasonable thus, making it difficult for developing countries to meet the requirements 
within the prescribed time.  
It is of great concern that in particular access to appropriate scientific and technical 
expertise, is a problem. Indeed, in “many developing countries knowledge of SPS 
issues is poor402, both within government and the food supply chain, and the skills 
required to assess SPS measures applied by developed countries are lacking”.403 
Apart from that, article 3 (as was discussed in the chapters) of the SPS Agreement 
encourages countries to use international standards as a basis for their regulations. In 
annex A it: 
“recognizes for food safety the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, for animal health those 
developed by the International Office of Epizootics (OIE), and for plant protection 
those developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC)”.404  
 
Apart from that, issues that are not dealt with by these organizations, standards 
facilitated by other relevant international organizations open for membership to all 
Members, as identified by the SPS Committee, are recognized.405 However, the 
Agreement does not specifically stipulate the procedures that should be followed by 
                                                                 
402 These countries comprise of ACP and SADC countries in particular three quarters of the African 
countries which are involved in international trade. 
403 Hagedoorn, M.L.F., 2002. Support of the Netherlands to capacity building in developing countries. 
In FAO/WHO Global Forum of Food Safety Regulators, Marrakesh (Morocco), 28-30 Jan 2002. FAO. 
404 S. Zarrilli: “WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures; Issues of Developing Countries, 
South Centre July 1999, page 16. 
405 R. Griffin: History of the Development of the SPS Agreement; Plant and Protection Division, page11.  
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relevant international organizations so as to produce genuine international standards.406 
Hence this brings the issue of uncertainty as to what international standards to follow if 
no specific organisation is stipulated. 
 
5.3   RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is therefore fitting to note that as of late SPS requirements are one of the greatest 
impediments to market access for developing countries in terms of trade in agricultural 
and food products. This is due to the fact that there have been many disputes407 
submitted to the WTO concerning the implementation of the SPS agreement as have 
been discussed in the previous chapters.  
However, market access will not be achieved if SPS measures are not dealt with fairly 
and uniformly. Certainly, there is need to implement SPS measures to developing 
countries in line with the commitments of the SPS Agreement itself. Such commitments 
include the objective of extending special treatment408 to developing countries as 
highlighted in the preamble of the WTO and Article 10 of the SPS. 
Apart from that, for international trade to be facilitated the SPS measures must be 
regulated fairly taking into consideration the needs of the developing countries. In order 
to achieve this, there is need to improve transparency (between Members) and relevant 
international organisations, promote harmonization and prevent the implementation of 
SPS measures which lack adequate scientific justification.409 Much of this however, 
depends on the ability of developing countries to effectively participate in the 
implementation of the Agreement namely: standard setting processes.410 In support of 
this recommendation Henson and Loader as quoted by N.Mupure submitted that, 
                                                                 
406 The WTO Agreements Series: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Accessed on 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries4_sps_e.pdf&sa. 
407 Consider, the EC Hormones case, Japan Apples case, SA-EU dispute etc. 
408 Special treatment in the course of the Uruguay Round, agreement, also by the Southern governments 
on the principle of the so-called Single Undertaking turned out to be crucial to the 
Design of special treatment in the WTO agreements. Single Undertaking meant that all WTO candidates 
have to accept all agreements of the Uruguay Round as a whole.  
409 Though the SPS Agreement specifically provides for the regulation of these contemplated areas there 
is uncertainty pertaining to these areas resulting in the weak implementation thereof. 
410 The SPS Agreement art 13. 
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“developing countries will only actualize the potential benefits of the Agreement if they 
are willing and able to participate in the institutions it establishes”.411 With this in mind, it 
should also be highlighted out that, in most cases willingness to participate is always 
available but ability is often the obstacle. Hence, for developing countries to be able to 
effectively participate in the implementation of the SPS measures, they need to be 
assisted to achieve it. 
It is also significant to recommend that, developed countries in applying the SPS 
measures, they should be in line with art 3.1 of the Agreement which purports that 
“measures should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health”.412 As such they should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail.413 It could be inferred 
that developed countries should not rush to conclude that they are protecting their plant, 
animal and human health thus imposing these measures arbitrarily without proper 
scientific justification. In particular, “these members are encouraged to use proper 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist and where 
they are applicable”.414 
Although the International community has tried to harness the trade distortive effects of 
SPS measures by enacting the SPS Agreement, many developing countries fail to 
utilize the opportunity as they lack the resources.415 Henson and Loader points out that:  
“this again reflects the relatively poor scientific and technical infrastructure in 
many developing countries.  It can also be recommended that, the WTO and 
                                                                 
411Mupure, L.N.A (2014) International Trade Law, “A Critical assessment on the Impact of SPS measures 
on Market Access for Developing Countries: Case Study of South Africa and Kenya. University of 
KwaZulu-Natal page 80-82. 
412 SPS Agreement article 3.1 
413 Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
414 Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
415  Henson, S. J and Loader, R.J page 9-10. 
83 
 
international standard organisations need to facilitate the more effective 
participation of developing countries”.416  
This may involve for example “changes to procedures and provision of technical and 
other forms of assistance”.417 Moreover, developed countries have to consider needs 
and special circumstances of developing countries and to take these into account when 
implementing the SPS measures.418 
Furthermore, Henson and Loader as quoted by Mupure N, his dissertation asserted 
that, 
 “effective participation hinges upon the following key areas: representation in the 
WTO and its related institutions namely the SPS committees and international 
standards organisations; effective participation in activities associated with the 
SPS Agreement and institutional capacity in developing countries in order to 
implement effective SPS controls and to comply with commitments under the 
SPS Agreement.”419 
Apart from that, although in the Agreement it is provided that, technical assistance 
should be provided to Member countries, this does not happen in practice as insufficient 
technical assistance is given to developing countries.420 Henson and Loader have 
purported that, “developed countries takes insufficient account of the needs of 
developing countries in setting SPS requirements”.421 This is a flaw in international trade 
because most of the SPS requirements are too rigid and expensive and to make 
matters worse, most developing countries fail to adapt and to implement these 
                                                                 
416 S.J Henson and R.J Loader: The Impact of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures on Developing 
Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Exports, October, 1999 page 10.  
417 Henson, S.J and Loader, R.J  page 10-11 
418 S.J Henson and R.J Loader page 11. 
419 Mupure N.L.A,  (see note above 407; 83). 
420 In terms of implementing the SPS measures the time limit  periods allowed for developing countries 
needs to be reconsidered as many developing countries are failing to live up to these standards. 
Examples include the efficacy of prevailing systems of the SPS controls, development of scientific and 
technical expertise and access to modern testing methods. These countries include South Africa, Kenya, 
Netherlands, India, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
421 Henson, S.J and Loader, R.J:  The Impact of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures on Developing 
Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Exports, October, 1999 page 10-11. 
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requirements as they face insurmountable difficulties in trying to do so. Hence it can be 
recommended that, in implementing the SPS measures developed countries should 
consider also the vulnerable economic position of developing countries and thus 
technical assistance must be provided such that the implementation may be attained in 
a fair manner. 
Furthermore in relation to technical assistance, it is further recommended that it should 
be largely in the form scientific infrastructure and expertise since science is considered 
as the “touchstone against which SPS measures must be judged”.422 This entails 
making technical cooperation in terms of Article 9 of the SPS Agreement mandatory. If 
technical cooperation is to be made mandatory by the Agreement it would deter 
developed countries from arbitrarily adopting SPS measures since they would be 
obligated to share the burden of infrastructural capacity building and the costs of 
ensuring compliance with their imposed SPS requirements. 
Since 2012 after the CBS was discovered the EU expects full compliance with the EU 
phyto-sanitary measures and a threshold of not more than 5 interceptions for CBS in 
one trading season have been set up.423 In case of failure, the EU would consider to 
initiate the procedure of safeguard measures against citrus fruits from SA.424 This has 
been considered to be a very strict approach followed by the EU; it can be 
recommended that, their ban should be based on scientific justification for it to be 
implemented and it should not be too strict. 
In October 2014, SA involved the WTO in the citrus dispute with the EU as the citrus 
growers in SA argued that the reasons for the ban of citrus fruits in the EU are based on 
shaky grounds.425 It should be noted that, earlier this year the European Commission 
standing committee on plant and health endorsed stricter import requirements for SA’s 
                                                                 
422Bossche, D Prévost & M Matthee ‘WTO Rules on Technical Barriers To Trade’ Maastricht Work ing 
Papers (2005-6) 27 also see Zarilli 
423 C Dunmore ‘EU bans South African citrus imports over disease fears’ Reuters 28 November 2013. 
424http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/6611-sanitary-and-phytosanitary-measures-citrus-black-spot-
and-american-foulbrood-disease.html accessed on 21/09/16 at 20.57pm. 
425 http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/south-africa-involves-wto-in-citrus-dispute-with-
the-eu Accessed on 16/12/16 at 13.10pm. 
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citrus fruits to Europe.426 It was said that, imported citrus would be subjected to more 
strict measures, as pre and post-harvest chemical treatments would be recorded. Apart 
from that, packing houses and official on-site inspections at citrus orchards will be 
obligated to be registered.427 However, this is not economically suitable for SA as it has 
been singled out for special treatment by the EU in this instance. 
Although, the SPS Agreement provides for discipline in the use of SPS measures, it is 
recommended that developing countries must be included in the operation of the 
Agreement. More so, a sense of ownership of the Agreement needs to be facilitated 
among low and middle-income Members of the WTO.428 
Furthermore, developing countries themselves need to implement institutional 
structures and procedures (such as in terms of transportation logistics and distribution 
systems) that allows national agricultural producers and food processors to comply with 
the SPS requirements they face in developed country markets.429 Developing countries 
need to act on all three levels to overcome the barriers faced by developing countries 
caused by SPS requirements and thus enable them to participate better in the world 
trading system for agricultural and food products.430 It should also be noted that, Article 
6 of the SPS Agreement which pertains to adaption to regional conditions is another 
provision that requires review.  
One of the concerns raised by developing countries in light of Article 6 is that the full 
benefits of regionalization, as contemplated in the provision, are not being realized due 
to the difficulties in implementing this provision.431 The process of proving that some 
areas are pest and/or disease free is time consuming and complex. As such the 
process can be onerous since it requires scientific and infrastructural support which is 
usually lacking in developing countries. In light of these problems it is recommended 
                                                                 
426 http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/south-africa-involves-wto-in-citrus-dispute-with-
the-eu Accessed on 16/12/16 at 13.10pm 
427http://www.zestfruit.co.za/2016/06/20/eus-decision-on-citrus-black-spot-has-ended-uncertainity 
Accessed on 12/16/16 at 14.30pm.  
428 S.J Henson and R.J Loader; Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role of 
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Requirements, world development page 99-100. 
429 Henson, S.J and Loader, R.J page 99-100. 
430 Henson, S.J and Loader, R.J page 90-100. 
431Bossche et al page 65 
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that this provision should explicitly make reference to the effect that “scientific and 
administrative support shall be provided by international organizations and developed 
countries to developed countries to facilitate implementation of the Article 6 
provisions”.432  
 
Apart from that, the issue of market access is also another area which needs 
recommendations when it comes to the SPS Agreement implementation. Market access 
of developing countries is adversely affected by the limited time afforded to developing 
countries between notification and implementation of SPS measures; it is recommended 
that adequate time (for example 8months must be afforded) be afforded to the 
developing countries. Thus, the Agreement should specifically stipulate that the 
timeframe between notification and implementation should be determined relatively, 
taking into consideration special needs and circumstances of developing countries. It 
would be more rational to afford developing countries more time to comply with the SPS 
requirements given their limited infrastructural capacity and lack of requisite expertise.  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
As a way of inference, the research has proven that SPS measures impede trade 
between developing countries and developed countries and a number of issues have 
been raised and concerns that relate to the market access of developing countries into 
developed countries. The support for this assertion can be drawn from the difficulties 
that SPS measures in general impose on developing countries in respect of 
implementation of SPS measures and the standard of care required in most cases is 
very stringent. It can be argued that SPS measures have the potential to be used to 
impede trade as observed by the disputes namely the EC-Hormones and Japan Apples 
case.433 Furthermore, they can impede trade since they have the potential to be 
improperly applied without due consideration of the relevant rules. Consequently, this 
                                                                 
432 see Zarrilli page 25 
433 EC Hormones, Appellate body report, EC Measures concerning meat and meat products(Hormones), 
WT/D526/ABIR, WT/D548/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:1, 135 and Japan –Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Apples, Report of the Panel, WT/D5245/R, 15 July 2003. 
87 
 
problem hinders the market access of developing countries into developed countries’ 
markets. Another significant point raised was the susceptible nature of SPS measures 
which may result in their use as domestic protectionist tools as was observed in the 
CBS dispute between SA and EU.   
Although the international community has attempted to deal with effects of SPS 
measures through the SPS Agreement, many developing countries lack the resources 
necessary to exploit the opportunities offered by the Agreement.434 This is due to the 
fact that the SPS standards are too stringent and very high such that developing 
countries fail to implement them.435 Again this reflects the relatively poor scientific and 
technical infrastructure in many developing countries.  
As it has been pointed above, developing countries have concerns about the way in 
which the SPS Agreement is implemented especially the way in which the needs of 
developing countries are catered for. This is further highlighted by the periods of time 
allowed between the notification and implementation of SPS measures. Certainly, 
specific methods need to be provided so as to facilitate the better inclusion of 
developing countries in the operation of the Agreement and also accommodating the 
needs of low and middle-income Members of the WTO. 
Conclusively, the SPS Agreement should be reviewed in light of the difficulties that 
developing countries encounter in implementing the Agreement. This review should be 
undertaken in respect of the problems outlined in the recommendations. Secondly, the 
review of the highlighted provisions ought to be dealt with by the unified effort of both 
developing and developed countries as well as other relevant stakeholders. This would 
ensure effective participation which is an important determinant in developing countries’ 
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